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New abortion regulations have been sweeping the nation, and the debate the
U.S. Supreme Court had hoped to quell when it handed down its decision in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey1 has raged on, with
emotions running as high as ever.2 The new regulations have been wide-ranging
and, among other things, have included requirements that physicians who
perform abortions have hospital admitting privileges, that abortion facilities
+
Associate Professor of Law, Elon University School of Law; B.S.C., J.D., Washington and Lee
University.
1. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
2. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844, 901 (1992) (noting that
“[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt” and claiming to have “define[d] the freedom
guaranteed by the Constitution’s own promise . . . ”); see also State Policies on Abortion,
GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, https://www.guttmacher.org/united-states/abortion/state-policiesabortion (last visited July 28, 2016) (indicating that 288 abortion restrictions were adopted between
2011 and 2015); Janet Reitman, The Stealth War on Abortion, ROLLING STONE, (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-stealth-war-on-abortion-20140115 (noting that,
since 2010, “30 states have passed 205 anti-abortion restrictions, more than in the previous decade,”
and giving examples of new restrictions).
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meet standards applicable to ambulatory surgery centers, that women see
ultrasounds before choosing abortion, and, most recently, that physicians
administer anesthesia to alleviate fetal pain.3 Not surprisingly, these measures
have generated both praise and scorn. Abortion foes hail them as important steps
to make abortion safer, to ensure that women make more informed decisions,
and to protect the unborn.4 Pro-choice advocates, on the other hand, see the new
directives as calculated attempts to restrict women’s access to a procedure that
has been legal for over 40 years.5
In Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,6 the Supreme Court’s first major
abortion decision in over two decades, the Court weighed in on two regulations
adopted in the recent wave—Texas admitting privileges and ambulatory surgery
center requirements—and declared that they unconstitutionally burdened a
woman’s right to choose.7 The Hellerstedt decision undoubtedly represents a
significant legal victory for those who oppose abortion restrictions, but what it
may mean for the many other regulations of recent vintage is far from clear.
Public sentiment about abortion regulation is similarly hard to gauge.8 There
appears to be a widely-held belief that the abortion decision should be made by

3. See Reitman, supra note 2 (giving examples of new restrictions on abortion); Jack Healy,
When Can Fetuses Feel Pain? Utah Abortion Law and Doctors Are at Odds, N.Y. TIMES (May 4,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/05/us/utah-abortion-law-fetal-anesthesia.html?_r=0
(discussing Utah’s recent law requiring that a woman having an abortion at 20 weeks or more
gestation receive anesthesia).
4. See, e.g., NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE, http://www.nrlc.org/statelegislation/ (last visited
Feb. 26, 2016) (recognizing ultrasound laws as informed consent measures and asserting that
informed consent requirements “lower[] the abortion rate and protect[] unborn children because
pregnant mothers are able to receive factual scientific information . . . ”); Sandhya Somashekhar,
Admitting-privileges laws have created high hurdle for abortion providers to clear, WASH. POST
(Aug. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/2014/08/10/62554324-1d88-11e482f9-2cd6fa8da5c4_story.html (“[Clinics] need to provide the best of care and have a physician
with admitting privileges” (quoting abortion opponent)); Healy, supra note 3 (indicating that, in
supporting Utah’s new law requiring the administration of anesthesia, “[a]nti-abortion groups and
lawmakers in Utah said they were acting out of concern for the fetus”).
5. See, e.g., Reitman, supra note 2 (“The politicians [have] . . . come up with laws that are
unnecessary, technical and hard to follow, which too often forces clinics to close” (quoting Nancy
Northup of the Center for Reproductive Rights)); Somashekhar, supra note 4 (“Abortion rights
proponents . . . argue that admitting privileges are medically unnecessary . . . They regard the bills
as a back-door attempt to shut down clinics. . . .”).
6. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
7. See id. at 2300 (striking down Texas laws requiring that a physician performing an
abortion have admitting privileges at a local hospital and that abortion facilities meet the minimum
standards applicable to Texas ambulatory surgery centers).
8. See Irin Carmon, Why it’s so hard to measure public opinion on abortion, MSNBC (Jan.
1, 2016), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/why-its-so-hard-measure-public-opinion-abortion (noting
the difficulty in assessing opinions about abortion).
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a woman in consultation with her doctor.9 With polls indicating that the public
also disfavors unrestricted access to abortion, 10 though, one might ask how
people envision abortion consultation and the doctor who helps a woman
navigate the various considerations associated with what Justice Stevens
described as “a difficult choice having serious and personal consequences of
major importance to her own future—perhaps to the salvation of her own
immortal soul . . . .”11 It certainly is easy to imagine a scene in which a woman
makes her choice after spending extensive time with her long-time ob/gyn12 or
family physician. And perhaps it is so easy to imagine this scene because it is
one the Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade13 evokes when it indicates that, before
having an abortion, the woman and her doctor will have a discussion that
“necessarily”14 will cover a multitude of critical factors.
Yet, this image likely does not reflect reality in most cases. The vast majority
of ob/gyns are unwilling to perform abortions,15 so women typically must turn
to specialists who may be unknown to them until they perform a Google
search. 16 These specialists may be very skilled in performing the abortion
procedure itself, but one can question whether they are prepared to have the type
of discussion Roe suggests, and there is evidence that—for whatever reason—
robust consultations do not always occur.17 The absence of meaningful dialogue
is cause for concern, as the Court in Hellerstedt highlighted when it struck down

9. See Poll Results: Abortion, YOUGOV (Jan. 16, 2014, 1:26 PM), https://today.you
gov.com/news/2014/01/16/poll-results-abortion/ (indicating that, in a 2014 survey, 64% of adults
believed “[d]ecisions on abortion should be made by a woman and her doctor”).
10. Gallup, Abortion, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx (last visited July 28,
2016) (reflecting that, in polls taken from 2010 to 2016, between 69% and 73% of those responding
thought that abortion either should be “legal only under certain circumstances” or “illegal in all
circumstances”).
11. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 781 (1985)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
12. The term “ob/gyn” refers to a physician trained in obstetrics and gynecology.
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. Id. at 153.
15. See Debra B. Stulberg, Annie M. Dude, Irma Dahlquist, and Farr A. Curlin, Abortion
Provision Among Practicing Obstetricians-Gynecologists, 118 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 609,
609 (2011) (concluding based on a study of 1,800 physicians that, “[a]mong practicing ob-gyns,
97% encountered patients seeking abortions, whereas only 14% performed them”).
16. See Eyal Press, A Botched Abortion, NEW YORKER (Feb. 3, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/02/03/a-botched-operation (discussing experiences of
women who used Google to find a physician to perform an abortion).
17. See DAVID C. REARDON, ABORTED WOMEN SILENT NO MORE 328, 335 (1975) (noting
that, in a survey of 252 women across 42 States, 70% of those responding reported that they had
not made their decision to have an abortion in consultation with a physician, 73% indicated that
they believed information was withheld or that they received incorrect information, and 64%
claimed that they were not encouraged to ask questions).
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Texas’s ambulatory surgical center requirement. 18 Indeed, the inability to
receive “individualized attention, serious conversation, and emotional
support” 19 increases “the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to
discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision
was not fully informed.”20
This Article offers a means to mitigate this risk, proposing legislation that
would require a woman, in a manner compatible with her constitutional rights,
to consult with her regular ob/gyn or family physician before having an abortion.
Part I of the Article describes Roe’s view of the physician’s role in a woman’s
decision to have an abortion and the threats posed by a lack of meaningful preabortion counseling. Part II proposes a model statute designed to protect against
these threats and details the benefits of requiring a woman to consult with her
regular physician before choosing to terminate her pregnancy. Part III analyzes
the constitutionality of the model legislation, explaining how it is consistent with
a woman’s constitutional rights. Part III first considers the implications of the
proposed statute with respect to a woman’s substantive due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Then, it explores how requiring disclosure of a
woman’s decision to her primary ob/gyn or internist relates to her First
Amendment right to be free from government-compelled speech. Finally,
having confirmed the constitutionality of the model legislation, the Article urges
states to adopt the proposed statute and suggests that both sides of the abortion
debate ought to line up in support.
I. THE PROMISE OF ROE—AND REALITY
The Supreme Court in Roe presented a vivid picture of how a woman would
arrive at a decision to have an abortion. Rather than deciding quickly or alone,
she would make the decision to terminate her pregnancy only after a long and
detailed discussion with her trusted physician. The discussion would cover a
broad range of considerations relating to the possible detriments associated with
the woman’s continuing her pregnancy:
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early
pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may
force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological
harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by
child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with
the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a
18. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318 (2016) (suggesting that,
with the ambulatory surgery center requirement, women would be “less likely to get the kind of
individualized attention, serious conversation, and emotional support” they otherwise might
receive).
19. Id.
20. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
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family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.
In [some] cases, . . . the additional difficulties and continuing stigma
of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are factors the
woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in
consultation.21
Indeed, given the depth of knowledge required for a physician to provide
meaningful guidance to a woman based on her particular circumstances, it seems
that the Court in Roe expected that a woman considering abortion would turn to
her long-time physician to perform the procedure.22
If the image Roe suggested represented reality in the period immediately
following the decision, it does not today. 23 Most ob/gyns are unwilling to
perform abortions.24 Therefore, doctors performing abortions tend to specialize
in the procedure rather than devote their time to comprehensive gynecological
care.25
Specialization, of course, has its benefits. Physicians who focus on abortion
have the opportunity to hone and perfect their technical skill and perhaps have
the ability to enhance their understanding of how abortion affects women
21. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Not long after Roe, the Court reinforced this
view in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., stating that “in Roe and
subsequent cases we have ‘stressed repeatedly the central role of the physician . . . in consulting
with the woman about whether or not to have an abortion . . . .’” Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 447 (1983) (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979));
see also id. at 443 (“It remains primarily the responsibility of the physician to ensure that
appropriate information is conveyed to his patient, depending on her particular circumstances.”).
Mysteriously, though, the Court in Akron also eroded the view of the importance of the physician’s
own personal involvement in the counseling process, concluding that requiring consultation with a
physician—as opposed to some other person qualified to counsel a woman—was incompatible with
a woman’s constitutional right to choose. Id. at 448 (“We are not convinced, however, that there
is as vital a state need for insisting that the physician performing the abortion, or for that matter any
physician, personally counsel the patient in the absence of a request.”). The Court in Casey,
however, changed course and determined that a State can place the responsibility for counseling on
a physician. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 885 (upholding the constitutionality of a requirement that a
physician himself or herself provide information to a woman seeking an abortion).
22. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
23. Emily Bazelon, The New Abortion Providers, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (July 14, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/magazine/18abortion-t.html?_r=0 (“In 1973, hospitals made
up 80 percent of the country’s abortion facilities . . . 15 years later, 90 percent of the abortions in
the U.S. were performed at clinics.”).
24. See Stulberg, et al., supra note 15, at 609 (concluding based on a study of 1,800 physicians
that, “[a]mong practicing ob-gyns, 97% encountered patients seeking abortions, whereas 14%
performed them”).
25. According to a study by the Guttmacher Institute, 63% of the abortions in 2011 were
performed in abortion clinics, a term defined as “nonhospital facilities in which half or more of
patient visits are for abortion services,” and 60% of the abortions were completed in clinics that
perform 1,000 or more abortions per year. Rachel K. Jones & Jenna Jerman, Abortion Incidence
and Service Availability In the United States, 2011, 46 PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL AND
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 3, 5, 6 (2014).
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generally. In exchange for a deep understanding of the procedure and its general
effects, however, the specialist sacrifices a deep understanding of each woman
who comes to him or her seeking an abortion. Simply put, an intake form and a
few questions are no substitute for the depth of information a physician
providing comprehensive care will obtain during the course of a relationship that
begins in less trying circumstances.
To be sure, the sacrifices associated with specialization are not unique to
abortion. What is different, however, is how the relationship between a woman
and an abortion specialist often comes about. It is hard to imagine, for example,
that a person who suspects he or she has cancer or a heart problem would turn
to the internet to select an oncologist or a cardiologist. Instead, except in an
emergency situation, one would expect the person first to approach his or her
regular physician, who would evaluate the patient’s symptoms in light of his or
her medical history, discuss the particular problem with the patient based on the
physician’s knowledge of the patient, and then refer the patient to a specialist
for further evaluation or assistance if necessary. Indeed, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (“HHS”) emphasizes the importance of having a
person’s regular physician involved in managing his or her healthcare in this
way, stating that “[p]rimary care providers are critical for providing preventive
care, ensuring coordinated care, and improving health outcomes for
Americans,” 26 and Congress accordingly took a number of steps in the
Affordable Care Act to increase access to primary care physicians.27 Moreover,
insurance companies sometimes condition coverage for specialists’ services on
obtaining referrals from primary care doctors.28
Notwithstanding the seriousness of the decision,29 however, a woman may not
seek guidance from her regular ob/gyn or internist when considering abortion,
26. Creating Primary Health Care Jobs by Addressing Primary Care Workforce Needs, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts-and-features/factsheets/creating-health-care-jobs-by-addressing-primary-care-workforce-needs/index.html
(last
visited Feb. 26, 2016).
27. See id. (detailing measures in the Affordable Care Act to increase access to primary care
physicians).
28. Requirements Guide, UNITEDHEALTHCARE, https://www.unitedhealthcareonline.com/
ccmcontent/ProviderII/UHC/enUS/Assets/ProviderStaticFiles/ProviderStaticFilesPdf/Referral_Re
quirements_Quick_Reference.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2016) (requiring submissions of referrals for
certain specialists); How do referrals work in my HMO plan?, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD BLUE
CARE NETWORK OF MICHIGAN, http://www.bcbsm.com/index/health-insurance-help/faqs/plantypes/hmo/how-do-referrals-work-in-my-hmo-plan.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (“For most,
but not all, HMO plans, you’ll need a referral from your primary care physician before you can see
any other health care professional (except in an emergency).”).
29. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the seriousness of the abortion decision.
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992) (noting that the decision to
have an abortion “has such profound and lasting meaning”); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976) (“The decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often a
stressful one, and it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its nature
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but instead may look to Google or a similar source to select an abortion
specialist. 30 Unfortunately, when a woman chooses this course, she may be
forfeiting the wisdom of a physician who may know her well, thereby increasing
“the risk that [she] may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating
psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully informed.”31 A
woman also may be exposing herself to the threat of physical harm by a
physician who may be unskilled or, worse, incompetent in performing abortions.
As the story of Kermit Gosnell attests,32 this threat is not merely theoretical, and
Gosnell’s story is not the only one about an abortion doctor who has placed
women’s lives in jeopardy.33 The risks associated with a woman’s bypassing
her primary care physician and striking out on her own to obtain an abortion,
therefore, are extremely serious, and they warrant governmental action.

and consequences.”); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 448 (1983)
(“[W]e do not suggest that the State is powerless to vindicate its interest in making certain the
‘important’ and ‘stressful’ decision to abort ‘is made with full knowledge of its nature and
consequences.’” (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67)); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 641 (1979)
(describing as “very important” the “decision whether or not to bear a child” (quoting Danforth,
428 U.S. at 91 (Stewart, J., concurring))); id. at 642 (indicating that the abortion decision involves
“consequences so grave and indelible”); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1980) (“The
medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of an abortion are serious and can be
lasting[.]”); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“Whether to have an abortion requires
a difficult and painful moral decision . . . . The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice
is well informed.”). See also Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 781 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting that a woman deciding whether to have an
abortion is “faced with the reality of a difficult choice having serious and personal consequences
of major importance to her own future—perhaps to the salvation of her own immortal soul . . .”);
Casey, 505 U.S. at 919 (Steven, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Those who disagree
vehemently about the legality and morality of abortion agree about one thing: The decision to
terminate a pregnancy is profound and difficult.”); Akron, 462 U.S. at 474 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (“As we acknowledged in Danforth, the decision to abort is ‘a stressful one,’ and the
waiting period reasonably relates to the State’s interest in ensuring that a woman does not make
this serious decision in undue haste.”) (citation omitted); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 783 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he decision is fraught with serious physical, psychological, and moral
concerns of the highest order.”).
30. See Press, supra note 16 (discussing experiences of women who used Google to find a
physician to perform an abortion).
31. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
32. See William Saletan, What Happened to the Women, SLATE (Feb. 16, 2011, 5:34 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_back_alley/2011/02/what_happened_to_the
_women.html (indicating that a grand jury report in the case of Dr. Kermit Gosnell stated that
Gosnell “used unlicensed workers to administer anesthesia, failed to obtain patients’ informed
consent, gave them expired drugs; endangered their health with poor sanitation and broken
equipment, and caused the deaths of at least two women.”).
33. See William Saletan, The Next Gosnell, SLATE, (Feb. 25, 2011, 7:16 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_back_alley/2011/02/the_next_gosnell.html
(describing examples of misconduct by physicians who perform abortions); Press, supra note 16
(discussing Steven Brigham, a physician whose practices endangered women’s lives).
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II. A PATH TOWARD MEANINGFUL PRE-ABORTION CONSULTATION
Of course, no regulation will offer absolute assurance that a woman’s decision
to have an abortion will be fully informed or that the physician who performs
the procedure will be careful and competent. Nevertheless, states could take a
significant step toward achieving these ends by taking Roe at its word and
facilitating the type of consultation Roe contemplated. 34 The model statute
included in the Appendix to this Article (the “model statute”) attempts to do just
that by requiring, in appropriate circumstances, that a woman seeking an
abortion consult first with the ob/gyn or internist who provides her with
comprehensive—or primary—care (her “primary care physician”).35
A. The Pre-Abortion Consultation Enhancement Act
To facilitate consultation between a woman and her primary care physician,
the model statute, which is entitled the Pre-Abortion Consultation Enhancement
Act, requires a doctor performing an abortion for a woman to verify36 that the
woman has consulted 37 with her primary care physician and has requested a
referral from him or her to another physician who might perform the procedure.
In addition, the statute specifies that the physician performing the abortion must
(i) obtain evidence with respect to any recommendation the woman’s primary
care physician makes regarding the advisability of the woman’s having an
abortion and (ii) confirm that the woman’s primary care physician made a
referral or declined to do so.38
While adding new requirements, the model statute preserves—as it must
under the Court’s decision in Casey—the woman’s ability to make the “ultimate
decision.”39 A woman need not follow her primary care physician’s advice or
have her abortion performed by the physician to whom her primary care
34. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
35. See infra note 315 and accompanying text (describing the practice areas that are
considered primary care under North Carolina law). The model statute requires consultation with a
woman’s primary ob/gyn if she has one and can get an appointment with him or her within 72
hours. If the woman does not have a primary ob/gyn or cannot get an appointment within 72 hours,
the model statute requires consultation with her primary internist. The legislation easily could be
modified to require a woman to consult with one or the other or to give her the option to select the
doctor to consult. See Model Statute, infra APPENDIX Sec. 3(b).
36. The model statute provides a safe harbor for meeting its evidentiary requirements. While
not limiting the type of evidence that might satisfy the requirement, the statute includes a prescribed
form that, if signed by the woman’s primary care physician, will meet the statutory requirement.
See Model Statute, infra APPENDIX Sec. 3(c).
37. Id. Sec. 3(a). As used in this Article, the term “primary care consultation requirement”
refers collectively to the requirements set forth in Section 3 of the model statute.
38. If the primary care physician declines to make a referral, the model statute requires the
physician performing the abortion to obtain evidence with respect to any reasons why the primary
care physician declined to do so. See id. Sec. 3(a)(1)(E).
39. Id. Sec. 3(e). See also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
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physician refers her, and a primary care physician’s recommendation will not
impede the physician who performs the abortion from exercising his or her
professional judgment.40
The model statute also provides relief from the consultation requirement
under appropriate circumstances. First, the requirement does not apply in the
case of a medical emergency. 41 Second, the model statute provides an
exemption if the woman certifies in writing that she has no primary care
physician42 or has been unable to schedule an appointment within 72 hours of
her first attempt to do so.43 Finally, of course, the consultation requirement need
not be satisfied when a woman’s primary ob/gyn is the physician performing the
abortion.44
In addition to providing these reasonable exceptions, the model statute
contains provisions designed to facilitate meaningful consultation between a
woman and her primary care physician. First, to aid women in obtaining a
consultation appointment quickly, the model statute requires primary care
physicians to treat a woman’s request for consultation as a request for urgent
care and to schedule an appointment with the woman consistent with any
prioritization policy the primary care physician has with respect to appointments
for urgent care. 45 The statute thus aids women in obtaining consultations
quickly and shortening any delay the consultation requirement otherwise might
impose.46 Second, the model statute requires a primary care physician to provide
40. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (noting that “a State may not prohibit any woman from making
the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability”).
41. See Model Statute, infra APPENDIX Sec. 3(a).
42. The model statute, of course, offers no benefit to a woman who has no primary care
physician. As a result, low-income individuals may be less likely to receive the important
assistance the statute offers. One would hope that increased funding of community health centers
under the Affordable Care Act, however, will mitigate this problem. See Health Center Program,
HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, http://bphc.hrsa.gov/about/ healthcenter
factsheet.pdf (last visited July 28, 2016) (detailing the funding for community health centers under
the Affordable Care Act and explaining that “health centers emphasize coordinated primary and
preventive services or a ‘medical home’ that promotes reductions in health disparities for lowincome individuals, racial and ethnic minorities, rural communities and underserved populations”).
43. Model Statute, infra APPENDIX Sec. 3(b). Because the model statute requires consultation
with a primary internist only if a woman has no primary ob/gyn or cannot get an appointment with
her primary ob/gyn within 72 hours, to ensure that she can obtain an abortion with the shortest wait,
she would want to try to set up an appointment with her primary ob/gyn and her primary internist
contemporaneously. If she is able to get an appointment with her primary ob/gyn, she would cancel
the appointment with her primary internist, and if she is unable to get an appointment with either,
she could obtain the abortion after having waited only 72 hours.
44. Id.
45. Id. Sec. 4(a).
46. Id. Section 4(a) of the model statute would not help a woman whose physician is located
in a jurisdiction that is different from the one in which she plans to have an abortion. If multiple
jurisdictions adopt the model, however, the combination of statutes could facilitate the consultation
requirement.
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such consultation as he or she considers appropriate based on his or her
professional judgment. 47 And third, in an attempt to curb the influence that
financial compensation might have on the advice a primary care physician may
offer, the model statute bars remuneration for making referrals for abortions.48
B. Benefits of the Model Statute
By attempting to fulfill Roe’s promise, the model statute offers numerous
benefits. Many of these are similar to the benefits associated with getting a
second opinion. Others derive from having someone with a broad view of a
woman’s health involved in such an important decision.
Obtaining a second opinion is a practice that is widely acclaimed when one is
considering a serious medical procedure. 49 The official U.S. Government
website for Medicare, for example, recommends a second opinion “if your
doctor says you need surgery to diagnose or treat a health problem that [is not]
an emergency.”50 An invited guest on a 2012 NPR Talk of the Nation program
about second opinions likewise emphasized that, “when you have a major
procedure that’s life-altering . . . you really . . . owe it to yourself . . . to get the
best advice you can.”51 Moreover, though largely driven by financial concerns
rather than patient health, insurers, including Medicare, sometimes require a
second opinion before covering certain procedures.52
47. Model Statute, infra APPENDIX Sec. 4(c). Like the scheduling provision, this provision
would not help a woman whose physician is located in a jurisdiction that is different from the one
in which she plans to have an abortion. See supra note 46.
48. Model Statute, infra APPENDIX Sec. 5.
49. See Renée Bacher, Half of Americans don’t get a second opinion, NBC NEWS (Feb. 4,
2008, 8:48 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/22829371/ns/health-health_care/t/half-americansdont-get-second-opinion/#.VYLnok_wvcu (indicating that “you must get a second opinion” when
“[y]our doctor suggests surgery” and that “[y]ou should always question elective (planned,
nonemergency) procedures”); Elizabeth Renter, 3 times you should get a second opinion about your
health, FOX NEWS (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/health/2014/09/26/3-times-shouldget-second-opinion-about-your-health/ (indicating that a second opinion is important “[w]hen your
doctor recommends a serious but non-emergency surgery”); Getting a Second Opinion, CIGNA,
http://www.cigna.com/healthwellness/hw/medical-topics/getting-a-second-opinion-ug5094 (last
visited Aug. 18, 2016) [hereinafter CIGNA] (“[A] second opinion may be a good idea if . . . [y]ou
are deciding about a costly or risky test or treatment, like a surgery.”).
50. Getting a Second Opinion before Surgery, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES, http://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/part-b/second-opinions-before-surger
y.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2016).
51. Talk of the Nation: When, And How, To Ask For a Second Medical Opinion (NPR radio
broadcast Jan. 19, 2012) [hereinafter NPR Broadcast] (comments by Laura Landro, assistant
managing editor of The Wall Street Journal, who had written an article entitled “What if The Doctor
is Wrong?”).
52. See Second Surgical Opinion, UNITEDHEALTHONE, http://www.goldenrule.com/
glossary-terms/second-surgical-opinion/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2016) (“Health insurance plans may
require a second opinion about the appropriateness of a surgery before providing coverage for the
procedure.”); Seeking a Second Opinion, CANCER.NET, http://www.cancer.net/navigating-cancer-
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In most cases, abortion is an elective procedure, and the Supreme Court
repeatedly has characterized it as a serious one.53 A second opinion, therefore,
makes sense when a woman is seeking an abortion, and by requiring her to
consult with her primary care physician before having the procedure, the primary
care consultation requirement will give her access to the numerous benefits
attendant to second opinions generally.
First, the primary care consultation requirement gives a woman another
opportunity to be heard54 and to learn about her options.55 During a consultation
with her primary care physician, a woman has the chance to receive a new
professional perspective on alternatives to abortion and on the impact of having
an abortion in her particular circumstances and considering her history, and this
new perspective could result in her choosing childbirth over abortion. In
addition, she may receive information regarding her options as to abortion
method—whether a particular chemical or surgical procedure might be more
beneficial from the standpoint of safety or cost. The primary care consultation
requirement, therefore, allows for a more informed decision, while still leaving
the final decision to the woman.56
Second, the primary physician consultation requirement may result in a
woman’s receiving better medical treatment. According to James Rohack, a
trustee with the American Medical Association, a second opinion is “the key to
getting the best diagnosis and treatment.” 57 Doctors make mistakes, 58 and
“[e]vidence is mounting that second opinions . . . can lead to significant changes
care/cancer-basics/cancer-care-team/seeking-second-opinion (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (“Some
insurance providers even require a second opinion before they will pay for cancer treatment.”);
Bacher, supra note 49 (“Insurance, including Medicare, frequently requires second opinions in [the
case of elective procedures].”).
53. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
54. See Renter, supra note 49 (recommending a second opinion “[w]hen you don’t feel like
you are being heard”).
55. See Bacher, supra note 49 (“[S]imply knowing your options and thinking through the pros
and cons can improve your care.”); Jacob Teitelbaum, M.D., Trust Your Doctor? When to Get a
Second Opinion, HUFFINGTON POST (June 26, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jacobteitelbaum-md/doctor-second-opinion_b_853210.html (“[I]t is good to get a choice of treatment
options.”); How to Get a Second Opinion, NATIONAL WOMEN’S HEALTH INFORMATION CENTER,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, https://www.womenshealth.gov/
publications/our-publications/second-opinion-how-to.pdf (“Getting a second opinion from a
different doctor might give you a fresh perspective and new information. It could provide you with
new options for treating your condition.”).
56. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (“What is at stake
is the woman’s right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in
doing so.”); CIGNA, supra note 49 (discussing second opinions and emphasizing that “the final
choice is yours”).
57. Bacher, supra note 49.
58. Id. (quoting Gail Gazelle, MD, assistant clinical professor of medicine at Harvard Medical
School, as stating “doctors can diagnose any problem incorrectly”).
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. . . in recommendations for treating a disease.”59 Pregnancy is not a disease, of
course, but a misdiagnosed ectopic pregnancy or a mistake in estimating the
gestational age of a fetus could have a significant impact on the abortion method
a doctor might choose and even on a woman’s decision to terminate her
pregnancy.60 The primary care consultation requirement helps to ensure that a
woman’s abortion provider receives information critical to the woman’s care,
thereby enhancing her medical treatment and decreasing the likelihood that she
will suffer adverse health consequences as a result of errors a doctor might make
because he or she does not have all of the significant facts.
Moreover, the primary care consultation requirement offers the added
advantage of insight from a doctor who is particularly familiar with the woman,
her medical history, and her particular circumstances. And this familiarity is
vital: “An accurate diagnosis depends on you[r] being able to communicate your
health history, symptoms and concerns.”61 In the midst of the trauma that may
be associated with an unexpected pregnancy, such communication could prove
difficult and a woman might fail to share critical information with the doctor she
sees to perform an abortion. By requiring a consultation with an existing
physician with whom a woman has a relationship, the primary care consultation
requirement reduces the likelihood that a crucial piece of personal medical
information will slip through the cracks and result in substandard care.
Third, the primary care consultation requirement protects against the inherent
bias a physician has when recommending a procedure from which he or she will
benefit financially.62 As one doctor points out:

59. Laura Landro, What if the Doctor Is Wrong?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2012),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203721704577159280778957336.
60. See Common Questions and Myths, Is medical abortion or aspiration abortion better?,
NATIONAL ABORTION FEDERATION, http://prochoice.org/think-youre-pregnant/common-questio
ns-and-myths/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (noting that “some women might have medical
conditions that would result in her provider recommending one [type of procedure] over the other”);
Pregnancy: Unplanned Pregnancy – About Abortion, CENTER FOR YOUNG WOMEN’S HEALTH,
http://youngwomenshealth.org/2014/09/05/pregnancy-abortion/ (last updated Sept. 5, 2014)
(noting reasons when a medication abortion is not appropriate). In addition, it is not unheard of for
a physician to perform an abortion procedure for a woman who is not pregnant. See REARDON,
supra note 17, at 240 (“Sun-Times reporters witnessed dozens of cases in which abortions were
performed on non-pregnant women.”).
61. Renter, supra note 49.
62. See Bacher, supra note 49 (quoting a physician as saying that “there may even be a
financial incentive for a physician to recommend one treatment over another”); NPR Broadcast,
supra note 51 (“[I]t was disappointing that my doctor didn’t want to educate me because he wanted
to . . . send me down the mainstream pipeline that’s endorsed by . . . his insurance indemnification
. . . . And it is the most profitable of things. So, . . . you have to bear in mind that that may be a
motive for some large doctors—some large hospital groups.”); See Teitelbaum, supra note 55
(recommending that, “if the first opinion came from a doctor in a specific specialty area, consider
getting the second opinion from someone of a different but related specialty”).
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Unfortunately, medicine [is] a business and economic factors often
cloud a practitioner’s judgment. This is not because they mean to
intentionally misguide you, but there are financial incentives involved
. . . . If the procedure is done by the recommending physician and is
a source of their income, then there is a heavy bias to believing that it
is good for the patient.63
While physicians who perform abortions may be well-intentioned, they are by
no means immune from these biases.64 A woman’s decision to have an abortion
certainly will have a financial impact on the physician whom she approaches to
perform the procedure, and the fees the doctor will receive may depend on the
method used.65 For example, according to the Guttmacher Institute, the average
cost in 2009 of a surgical abortion for a pregnancy at 10 weeks was $451, while
the average cost of a medication-induced abortion during that year was $483.66
Dr. LeRoy Carhart, one of the physicians who challenged the federal partialbirth abortion ban in Gonzales v. Carhart, 67 states that “the profit margin is
huge” for a particular type of medical abortion and sums up well the risks a
woman may face:
“Now you have two types of doctors doing abortions—the doctors
who are totally committed to women’s health and are going to do them
even if they never get another dime, and the people that just want to
take advantage of the [decrease in the number of abortion providers]
and milk everything they can get out of it.”68
The primary care consultation requirement offers important protection against
these financial biases—whether they are inherent or intentional.
The primary care consultation requirement also offers women benefits beyond
those normally associated with second opinions. It may steer women away from
unscrupulous doctors like Kermit Gosnell and to more competent ones. In
addition, a woman’s primary care physician may be able to recommend
professionals to help with any psychological or other complications that could
arise following an abortion.69 Moreover, the requirement gives a woman an

63. Teitelbaum, supra note 55 (emphasis added).
64. See REARDON, supra note 17, at 235 (“Abortion is big business, as abortion clinic owners
are the first to admit. And like other businesses, abortion clinics try to cut costs, increase
productivity, and maximize profits.”); RACHEL M. MACNAIR, PH.D., ACHIEVING PEACE IN THE
ABORTION WAR 50–52 (2009) (providing testimony of former abortion counselors regarding
marketing efforts by abortion providers).
65. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
66. Cost of Abortion Services in the United States, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE,
http://www.guttmacher.org/in-the-know/abortion-costs.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2016).
67. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
68. Press, supra note 16 (quoting Dr. Carhart).
69. See generally Catherine Anne Barnhard, Ph.D., The Long-Term Psychosocial Effects of
Abortion (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Union Institute & University) (analyzing the
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additional resource—one who already knows she might have an abortion—in
the event complications arise following the procedure. Finally, the requirement
will help to ensure that a woman’s primary care physician has information that
may be critical to her ongoing care. As one abortion provider notes: “[I]t’s
important to recognize that pregnancy and abortion are important parts of your
medical history, and we encourage you to be honest with your doctor.”70 By
requiring a woman to share her decision to have an abortion with her primary
care physician, the State thus helps to avoid the serious effects associated with
excessive fragmentation in the health care system, effects a guest on NPR’s Talk
of the Nation warned of: “[W]e’re having a fragmented [health care] system,
highly specialized, people going off in different directions, and nobody . . .
who’s bringing all of it together . . . . [O]ur health care in this country is going
to suffer as a result of that.”71
C. Enhancing Patient Autonomy
Of course, one might argue that the primary care consultation requirement
unnecessarily interferes with a woman’s autonomy and that, if a woman wants
to consult with her primary care physician, she always can do so. Yet, this
argument ignores the risk that a woman may be discouraged from talking with
her primary care physician even when she really wants to consult with him or
her. Indeed, despite the many benefits second opinions offer, a 2005 Gallup poll
found that “almost 50% of Americans never get second opinions.”72 The most
common reason was a fear of offending a physician, 73 and some patients
extent to which Posttraumatic Stress Disorder affects women who have had abortions); Teitelbaum,
supra note 55.
70. Abortion Clinics: Frequently Asked Questions, SUMMIT MEDICAL CENTERS,
https://www.summitcenters.com/frequently-asked-questions.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2016)
[hereinafter Questions].
71. NPR Broadcast, supra note 51 (comments by Dr. Leonard Lichtenfeld, deputy chief
medical officer for the American Cancer Society).
72. Bacher, supra note 49.
73. See id. (“Telling your doctor you want to see someone else for a second opinion can be
awkward . . . ”); NPR Broadcast, supra note 51 (“[D]oesn’t asking a second opinion insult the
doctor? How could it not? You’re saying that you don’t trust his opinion.”); Renter, supra note 49
(“Many people are nervous about getting a second opinion, worried their doctor will be angry.”);
CIGNA, supra note 49 (indicating that a patient ought not worry about “offending [his or her]
doctor”); Elizabeth Cohen, Five diagnoses that call for a second opinion, CNN (Aug. 30, 2007,
7:05 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2007/HEALTH/08/30/ep.second.opinion/index.html (“Even if it’s
hard, patients need to question their doctors.”); Should I Get a Second Opinion?, CENTER FOR
ADVANCING HEALTH,
http://www.cfah.org/prepared-patient/make-good-treatment-decisions/
should-i-get-a-second-opinion (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (“Others worry that their actions will be
seen as a ‘betrayal’ . . . . ”); How to Get a Second Opinion, OFFICE OF WOMEN’S HEALTH, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, https://www.womenshealth.gov/
publications/our-publications/second-opinion-how-to.pdf (last updated Sept. 10, 2008) (“Don’t
worry about hurting your doctor’s feelings.”).
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expressed concern that “they [would] receive worse care if they appear to be
pushy or difficult patients.”74 Moreover, “[m]any people feel uncomfortable
with questioning the authority or expertise of their physician.” 75 A woman
seeking an abortion would not be insulated from these disincentives, and in fact,
she may be more susceptible to them if she perceives her pregnancy to be a crisis.
When considering state-mandated measures designed to inform a woman’s
choice about abortion, there is a tendency to make several common assumptions:
all women seeking abortions are the same, all doctors providing abortion
services are the same, all women know whether they want additional information
and will not hesitate to seek it out, and all doctors will offer and deliver freely
whatever additional information at their disposal a woman might request. But
the universe of women seeking abortions and the universe of doctors performing
them obviously are not so limited. Some women might be ambivalent about
receiving certain information, but feel better after having it.76 Others may want
more information, but might not get it because a doctor is reluctant to provide
the information77 or has suggested implicitly that it would be a bother given his
or her already busy schedule.
All situations will be different, and the primary care consultation requirement
accommodates these many differences by ensuring that a woman who wants
meaningful consultation has an opportunity to get it. The requirement, for
example, will help a woman who is uncertain about her decision and wants to
consult an already familiar physician, but is experiencing pressure—from
spouses, boyfriends, parents, friends, or perhaps just societal expectations—not
to do anything that would cause a delay. It likewise will assist a woman who
wants meaningful consultation, but will not receive it from the doctor she
approaches for the abortion. Indeed, the model statute’s “one-size-fits-all”
approach, rather than impeding patient autonomy, enhances it.78

74. Should I Get a Second Opinion?, CENTER FOR ADVANCING HEALTH, http://www.cfah.
org/prepared-patient/make-good-treatment-decisions/should-i-get-a-second-opinion (last visited
Feb. 26, 2016).
75. Id. See also Renter, supra note 49 (“If you’re like most Americans, you trust your
physician to deliver an accurate diagnosis, and are reluctant to second-guess her judgment. After
all, she’s the one in the white coat with the expensive degree under her belt.”).
76. See, e.g., Stephanie Pappas, Abortion Debate: Little Evidence Sonograms Change Minds,
Doctors Say, LIVE SCIENCE (Feb. 16, 2011, 3:35 PM), http://www.livescience.com/12886abortion-sonogram-research.html (noting that a 2009 study found that 86% of women who chose
to view ultrasound images “said it was a positive experience”).
77. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (noting that “some doctors may prefer
not to disclose precise details of the means that will be used [to perform an abortion], confining
themselves to the required statement of risks the procedure entails”).
78. Contra Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 251–54 (4th Cir. 2014), cert denied 135 S. Ct.
2838 (2015) (stating that a patient’s autonomy with respect to informed consent is undermined
when the state chooses the manner and script that the doctor employs when interacting with the
patient).
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To be sure, for women who are absolutely certain about their decision, the
primary care consultation requirement may seem to be yet another box to check
off, a measure that does nothing more than result in delay and additional
expense. For a woman who is unsure, fearful, or under subtle or overt pressure,
however, the requirement offers an important refuge, one that might “reduc[e]
the risk that [she will] elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating
psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully informed.”79
III. A REQUIREMENT THAT RESPECTS A WOMAN’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The primary care consultation requirement offers women the many benefits
described above, but to deliver these benefits, the requirement must respect
women’s constitutional rights. And this it does. As the Supreme Court in Casey
teaches, “[w]hat is at stake is the woman’s right to make the ultimate decision,
not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so.” 80 The primary care
consultation requirement attempts to break down the barriers that might insulate
a woman from the necessary counsel that Roe contemplated, 81 but the
requirement always leaves to the woman the ultimate decision as to whether to
have an abortion.
A. The Primary Care Consultation Requirement Does Not Create an Undue
Burden on a Woman’s Right to Choose
1. Planned Parenthood v. Casey and Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt
Though one commonly thinks of Roe as providing the norm for assessing the
constitutionality of abortion regulations under the Fourteenth Amendment,
Casey—not Roe—now governs. 82 Indeed, the Supreme Court in Casey
discarded Roe’s “rigid trimester framework” 83 in favor of what the Court
described as Roe’s essential holding, a holding consisting of three parts:
First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an
abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference
from the State. Before viability, the State’s interests are not strong
enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a
substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the
procedure. Second is a confirmation of the State’s power to restrict
abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for
pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or health. And third is
the principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
Id. at 877.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 86–90 and accompanying text.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 873.
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the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the
fetus that may become a child.84
According to the Casey Court, the trimester framework departed from Roe’s
essence by overemphasizing a woman’s interest in choosing abortion and
undervaluing the State’s interest in protecting potential life,85 an interest that Roe
itself recognized as “important and legitimate.”86 Having identified this failing,
the Court decided that it needed a new standard to restore the proper
equilibrium.87
The Court accordingly adopted what it described as the “undue burden”
standard and, in so doing, sought to achieve the appropriate balance by
measuring the degree to which an abortion regulation interferes with a woman’s
right to choose abortion before viability.88 Under its new standard, the Court
explained, a law impermissibly interferes with a woman’s right to choose if the
law’s “purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”89 Absent such a purpose
or effect, however, reasonable laws aimed at protecting potential life and
“regulations designed to foster the health of a woman” will be upheld.90
Having articulated the standard, the Casey Court then applied it to the
Pennsylvania statute at issue in the case, a law that specified what information a
84. Id. at 846.
85. See id. at 873 (holding that “[t]he trimester framework suffers from these basic flaws: in
its formulation it misconceives the nature of the pregnant woman’s interest; and in practice it
undervalues the State’s interest in potential life, as recognized in Roe.”).
86. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). See Casey, 505 U.S. at 873 (indicating that Roe
had recognized the State’s interest in protecting potential life).
87. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 873.
88. See id. at 876 (stating “[i]n our view, the undue burden standard is the appropriate means
of reconciling the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected liberty.”).
89. Id. at 878.
90. Id. Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Akron suggests that Casey’s reference to reasonableness
connotes rational basis review for regulations that do not pose an undue burden. See City of Akron
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“If the
particular regulation does not ‘unduly burden’ the fundamental right, then our evaluation of that
regulation is limited to our determination that the regulation rationally relates to a legitimate state
purpose.” (internal citation omitted)). The Court’s decision in Hellerstedt, however, rejects this
interpretation and indicates that Casey requires a more searching review. See Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016) (indicating that the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in applying the second part of Casey’s test, was “wrong to equate the judicial review
applicable to the regulation of a constitutionally protected liberty with the less strict review
applicable where, for example, economic legislation is at issue”).
As to post-viability measures, Casey retained Roe’s standard, which allows States to regulate or
ban abortion, so long as exceptions are made in circumstances when a woman’s life or health is in
danger. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (“We also reaffirm Roe’s holding that ‘subsequent to viability,
the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and
even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother.’” (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65)).
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woman must receive as a prerequisite to obtaining her informed consent and that
included a mandatory 24-hour waiting period, a spousal notification
requirement, and a parental consent requirement.91 With the exception of the
spousal notification provision, the Court concluded that none of these measures
posed an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose abortion before viability
and therefore they were consistent with a woman’s rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.92
Pennsylvania’s informed consent provision charged a physician who was to
perform an abortion with the responsibility to “inform the woman of the nature
of the procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and the
‘probable gestational age of the unborn child.’” 93 In addition, the provision
required the physician or another qualified person to tell the woman about the
availability of State-prepared information regarding abortion alternatives,
medical assistance, the father’s obligations, and the development of an unborn
child. 94 According to the Court, neither aspect of Pennsylvania’s informed
consent mandate imposed an undue burden.95
In reaching its conclusion that the informed consent provisions passed muster,
the Court overruled its previous decisions in City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc. 96 and Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists 97 to the extent that those decisions applied
Roe’s trimester framework to strike down requirements that a woman be given
a specific body of information before an abortion.98 The Court explained that,
in Akron and Thornburgh, it had attached insufficient weight to the State’s
important interest in protecting potential life:
It cannot be questioned that psychological well-being is a facet of
health. Nor can it be doubted that most women considering an
abortion would deem the impact on the fetus relevant, if not
dispositive, to the decision. In attempting to ensure that a woman
apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the
legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an
abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological
consequences, that her decision was not fully informed.99

91. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 844 (describing the components of the Pennsylvania statute).
92. See id. at 881–900 (upholding the informed consent, waiting period, and parental consent
provisions and striking down the spousal notification requirement).
93. Id. at 881.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 881–900.
96. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
97. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
98. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
99. Id.
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Moreover, the Court emphasized that a State may “enact[] legislation aimed at
ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, even when in so doing the State
expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion.”100
The Court in Casey likewise upheld Pennsylvania’s 24-hour waiting period
under the undue burden standard, finding that the waiting period afforded a
woman a reasonable amount of time to consider her decision: “the idea that
important decisions will be more informed and deliberate if they follow some
period of reflection does not strike us as unreasonable, particularly where the
statute directs that important information become part of the background of the
decision.”101 The Court was unconvinced that the practical effects of the 24hour waiting period—that women who live some distance away from the
abortion facility may need to make two trips, resulting in a longer effective
waiting period, and that women would be subject to harassment by abortion
protesters twice—gave rise to a substantial obstacle.102 Moreover, the Court
explained that increased costs and delays do not, in and of themselves, create a
substantial obstacle.103 Finally, while acknowledging that the waiting period
infringed upon on the physician’s ability to exercise judgment, the waiting
period did not present a serious health risk for the woman because it did not
apply in the case of medical emergencies.104
The Court easily concluded that Pennsylvania’s parental consent requirement
was constitutional, noting that the Court had approved similar measures in the
past105 and stating that “[r]egulations which do no more than create a structural
mechanism by which . . . [a] parent or guardian . . . may express profound respect
for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to
the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.” 106 On the other hand, the Court
found that Pennsylvania’s spousal notification requirement impermissibly
encroached on a woman’s right to choose because, “in a large fraction of the
cases in which [the spousal notification provision was] relevant, it [would]
operate as a substantial obstacle.” 107 Defining the relevant population as
“married women . . . who do not wish to notify their husbands of their intentions”

100. Id. at 883.
101. Id. at 885.
102. Id. at 885–86.
103. Id. at 886 (“We do not doubt that, as the District Court held, the waiting period has the
effect of ‘increasing the cost and risk of delay of abortions,’ but the District Court did not conclude
that the increased costs and potential delays amount to substantial obstacles.”) (citation omitted).
104. Id.
105. See id. at 899 (“Our cases establish, and we reaffirm today, that a State may require a
minor seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian, provided that there is an
adequate judicial bypass procedure.”).
106. Id. at 877.
107. Id. at 895.
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and who would not qualify for an exception to the notification requirement,108
the Court cited detailed district court findings regarding the risks of abuse to a
large fraction of these women and their children.109 For these women, according
to the Court, the spousal notification requirement in substance constituted an
abortion ban.110
Now, almost 25 years later, the Court in Hellerstedt has employed the undue
standard to strike down Texas regulations that required physicians performing
abortions to have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals and that required
abortion facilities to meet the minimum standards applicable to ambulatory
surgery centers.111 Purporting to be faithful to Casey, the Court indicated that
the undue burden standard is a balancing test that requires a court to weigh the
burdens of an abortion regulation against its benefits 112 and not merely to
consider whether the regulation “ha[s] the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus,” with deference to the legislature if it does not have that purpose or
effect.113 According to the Court, under this balancing test, Texas’s admitting
privileges and ambulatory surgery center requirements were invalid. 114
In applying the undue burden test, the Court in Hellerstedt assumed that both
Texas regulations were aimed at protecting maternal health,115 which both Roe
and Casey identified as a legitimate state interest. 116 The Court determined,
however, that neither regulation conferred appreciable health benefits to women
who have abortions. In reaching this conclusion, the Court credited detailed
findings by the district court indicating that performing an abortion was a safe
procedure in Texas already. 117 Moreover, with respect to the ambulatory
surgery center requirement, the Court pointed to record evidence that other
108. Id.
109. Id. at 888–95 (citing district court findings and several studies as to the risk of abuse).
110. See id. at 894 (“[T]he significant number of women who fear for their safety and the safety
of their children are likely to be deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as if the
Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in all cases.”).
111. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016) (describing the
Texas regulations and concluding that they could not satisfy Casey’s undue burden test).
112. See id. at 2309 (indicating that the undue burden test is not a deferential standard, but
requires a court to consider a regulation’s benefits and burdens).
113. Id.
114. See id. at 2309 (striking down each of the Texas regulations as unduly burdensome).
115. See id. at 2310 (inferring the relevant state interest).
116. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (referencing Roe
and indicating that a state has a legitimate interest in “protecting the health of the woman”).
117. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2311–12 (indicating that “there was no significant healthrelated problem that the [admitting privileges requirement] helped to cure” and summarizing
detailed evidence supporting that conclusion); id. at 2315 (“There is considerable evidence in the
record supporting the District Court’s findings indicating that the statutory provision requiring all
abortion facilities to meet all surgical-center standards does not benefit patients and is not
necessary.”).
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procedures—including childbirth, colonoscopies, and liposuction—pose greater
health risks than abortion, but nevertheless may be performed in facilities that
do not meet Texas’s ambulatory surgical center standards.118 Finally, the Court
rejected the suggestion that the admitting privileges and ambulatory surgery
center requirements would cause unsafe facilities to shut down.119 According to
the Court, “[d]etermined wrongdoers, already ignoring existing statutes and
safety measures, are unlikely to be convinced to adopt safe practices by a new
overlay of regulations.” 120
The Hellerstedt Court also decided that the Texas admitting privileges and
ambulatory surgery center requirements imposed a number of burdens on—or
substantial obstacles in the path of—women seeking abortions pre-viability.121
In this regard, the Court credited evidence suggesting that the requirements both
individually and collectively caused the number of abortion facilities to decrease
dramatically. 122 The closures resulting from the admitting privileges
requirement, the Court asserted, would result in “fewer doctors, longer waiting
times, and increased crowding” and would require women to drive longer
distances for abortion services.123 Furthermore, the Court insisted, the record
included ample evidence that the ambulatory surgery center requirement would
leave an insufficient number of clinics to meet the demand for abortions in
Texas.124 Moreover, the Court was concerned that the clinic closures would
“force women to travel long distances to get abortions in crammed-to-capacity
superfacilities” in which women are “less likely to get the kind of individualized
attention, serious conversation, and emotional support that doctors at less taxed
facilities may have offered.” 125
The “individualized attention, serious conversation, and emotional support”
that the Hellerstedt Court identified as so important are precisely what the
primary care consultation requirement is designed to achieve. Nevertheless,
because the Court considered the Texas regulations at issue in Hellerstedt only
in relation to the state’s interest in maternal health, it is unclear how the undue
118. See id. at 2315 (comparing the safety of abortion to that of other procedures).
119. See id. at 2313 (rejecting a benefit the dissent cited).
120. Id. at 2313–14.
121. See id. at 2312, 2316 (indicating that both Texas regulations represented substantial
obstacles).
122. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2312, 2316 (noting that the lower court had found that, “as
of the time the admitting-privileges requirement began to be enforced, the number of facilities . . .
dropped in half, from about 40 to about 20” and that the parties agreed that the ambulatory surgery
requirement would further reduce the number of facilities to seven or eight).
123. Id. at 2313. While the Court acknowledged that increased driving distances alone would
not represent an unconstitutional burden, it stated that it was “one additional burden” that would
weigh against the lack of any health benefit. Id.
124. See id. at 2316 (discussing the district court’s conclusion regarding the ability of the
remaining Texas clinics to meet demand).
125. Id. at 2318.
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burden test applies to informed consent measures (like the primary care
consultation requirement) that advances both the state’s interest in protecting the
unborn and its interest in safeguarding maternal health. In describing what
Casey requires, the Court in Hellerstedt indicated only that Casey employed a
balancing test in assessing Pennsylvania’s parental consent and spousal
notification laws; the Hellerstedt opinion says nothing of Casey’s treatment of
Pennsylvania’s informed consent and waiting period provisions.126 Therefore,
one reasonably might argue that the undue burden test does not require balancing
with respect to a regulation like the primary care consultation requirement.127
Nevertheless, even if the balancing test described in Hellerstedt would apply,
the primary care consultation requirement satisfies the test because the
requirement shares the characteristics of the Pennsylvania informed consent and
waiting period provisions at issue in Casey, and in some respects, imposes fewer
burdens than the Pennsylvania regulations.
The model statute fits neatly within the bounds of Casey’s rationale for
upholding the Pennsylvania informed consent and waiting period requirements
for a number of reasons. First, the primary care consultation requirement is
“aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed,” 128 thereby reducing
the “risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with
devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully
informed.” 129 Through the primary care consultation requirement, a woman
should receive valuable information from a physician who knows her well,
information that a physician who sees a woman only for the purpose of having
an abortion may not have and information that an abortion provider may be
reluctant to provide given his or her financial interest in a woman’s decision to
choose abortion. Moreover, the primary care consultation requirement yields
the numerous other benefits detailed in Section II.B of this Article, including the
likelihood of receiving better medical care. Though an abortion provider may
126. Id. at 2309 (referencing only Pennsylvania’s parental consent and spousal notification
provisions in support of the assertion that Casey “requires that courts consider the burdens a law
imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer”).
127. The Court in Casey nowhere uses the word “benefit” in its discussion of Pennsylvania’s
informed consent and waiting period provisions. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 881–87 (1992) (addressing the informed consent and waiting period requirements). And
in assessing the spousal notification and parental consent provisions, the Court only uses the term
“benefit” in relation to the interest of a woman’s spouse in participating in the choice to have an
abortion and the state’s interest in protecting minors. See id. at 887–900 (discussing the spousal
notification and parental consent provisions). Thus, it seemed that the Casey Court’s undue burden
test itself struck the balance with respect to the states’ interests in protecting women’s health and
unborn life and that the test only required additional balancing when interests other those
considered in Roe were at play. See Thomas J. Molony, Roe, Casey, and Sex-Selection Abortion
Bans, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1109–29 (suggesting that a sex-selection abortion ban might
survive Casey’s undue burden test because such a ban serves other interests).
128. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883.
129. Id. at 882.
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ask about a woman’s medical history, it seems rather unremarkable to say that
the abortion provider will have a much more superficial understanding of a
woman and her health than her primary care physician will. Furthermore, amidst
the trauma of an unplanned pregnancy, a woman may forget to share with the
abortion provider important health information relevant to the woman’s decision
and the abortion method the physician may choose.
Second, the primary care consultation requirement imposes no burden on a
physician’s ability to exercise his or her medical judgment.130 The requirement,
like the Pennsylvania informed consent and waiting period provisions, does not
apply in the case of medical emergencies.131 In addition, it specifically provides
that it does not limit the right of a physician to perform an abortion. 132
Furthermore, nothing in the statute dictates what information either a primary
care physician or an abortion provider must provide a woman. 133 While the
statute requires a primary care physician to consult with a woman who secures
an appointment for consultation as contemplated by the law, the physician is free
to determine, based on each particular woman’s circumstances, what
information might be beneficial to her in her decision-making process and what
may pose a danger to her health.134 In many (if not most) cases, a primary care
physician possesses a deeper understanding of a patient’s health and
circumstances. Therefore, a woman’s primary care physician may be better able
to assess how providing certain information might affect her, and the physician
is free to share this assessment with the abortion provider, further advancing the
state’s interest in protecting a woman’s health.
Third, the primary care consultation requirement is consistent with customary
medical practice in some contexts. For example, it is not unusual for insurance
plans to require a referral from a primary care doctor before one sees a
specialist.135 As one abortion provider notes, “[d]epending on your policy, it
may be necessary to obtain a referral from a primary care physician before
setting up an abortion appointment.”136 Even when a referral is not required by
an insurance plan, seeing a primary care physician before seeing a specialist is a
130. See Model Statute, infra APPENDIX Sec. 3.
131. Id. Sec. 3(a) (“Except in the case of a medical emergency, no abortion shall be performed
upon a woman in this State unless, before the performance of the abortion, the physician who will
perform the abortion has received . . .”).
132. Id. Sec. 3(e)(ii) (stating “neither the recommendation of a woman’s primary care
physician nor any referral by such person shall limit . . . the ability of a physician to perform an
abortion for the woman.”).
133. See generally id. Sec. 3. See also Casey, 505 U.S. at 883–84.
134. See generally Model Statute, infra APPENDIX Sec. 4.
135. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (noting that insurance plans may condition
coverage of the costs of seeing specialist on a referral from a person’s primary care physician).
136. Abortion FAQs, Does my insurance cover the cost of an abortion?, FEMINIST WOMEN’S
HEALTH CENTER, http://www.feministcenter.org/abortion-care/faqs-about-abortion (last visited
Mar. 5, 2016).
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common practice.137 Therefore, though the law may not require a primary care
consultation in other circumstances, it certainly is not outside the norm of
medical practice and it aligns with what one would expect when considering a
serious medical procedure. 138 Moreover, the Supreme Court determined in
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth 139 that a State has
flexibility to adopt different requirements for different types of procedures.140
And even if the abortion procedure is safer than a diagnostic procedure like a
colonoscopy or liposuction as the Court in Hellerstedt asserted,141 the abortion
decision is different in kind from those other procedures because it implicates
the unborn, whom the state has an important interest in protecting.
Fourth, the fact that the primary care consultation requirement could impose
additional costs and delays does not mean that it imposes an undue burden under
Casey.142 To be sure, the primary care consultation requirement will impose an
additional cost on a woman seeking an abortion—the cost of an additional
doctor’s visit143—but, as the Court in Casey determined, additional costs alone
are not sufficient to invalidate an abortion regulation:
137. See Barbara Starfield, Leiyu Shi, & James Macinko, Contribution of Primary Care to
Health Systems and Health, 83 THE MILBANK Q. 457, 464 (2005), http://www.commonwealth
fund.org/usr_doc/Starfield_Milbank.pdf (“In some health systems, both in the United States and
abroad, people normally go to their primary care physician before seeking care elsewhere (such as
from another type of physician).”).
138. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (discussing a state’s interest in protecting unborn life).
139. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
140. See id. at 67 (“[W]e see no constitutional defect in requiring [informed consent] only for
some types of surgery as, for example, an intracardiac procedure, or where the surgical risk is
elevated above a specified mortality level, or, for that matter, for abortions.”); see also City of
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 430 (1983) (“In Danforth, . . . we
unanimously upheld two Missouri statutory provisions, applicable to the first trimester, requiring
the woman to provide her informed written consent to the abortion and the physician to keep certain
records, even though comparable requirements were not imposed on most other medical
procedures.” (emphasis added)).
141. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2315 (describing the risks of other procedures). The
Hellerstedt opinion also indicates that the risks of childbirth are higher than the risk of abortion,
but a woman giving birth very likely will involve her primary ob/gyn at least in some respects. See
id. (indicating the risk of childbirth in comparison to abortion); What Type of Practitioner is Right
for Your Pregnancy, WHAT TO EXPECT, http://www.whattoexpect.com/pregnancy/doctor-type/
(last visited July 28, 2016) (“More than 90 percent of women choose an . . . [OB-GYN to guide
them through pregnancy] . . . . Because your OB-GYN can function as your primary care physician,
he or she can make an excellent partner even after baby arrives.”).
142. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 886.
143. According to Healthcare Bluebook, $278 is a fair price for a 40-minute consultation with
respect to a complex medical problem. Office Visit, Established Patient (40 min.), HEALTHCARE
BLUEBOOK, https://healthcarebluebook.com/page_ProcedureDetails.aspx?id=227&dataset=MD&
g=Office+Visit%2c+Established+Patient%2c+Level+5 (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). The cost of the
additional doctor’s visit, however, should be the sole additional cost. One would expect that, in
most cases, a woman’s primary care physician will be located near the woman’s residence.
Therefore, the consultation requirement typically should not result in any significant travel costs.
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Numerous forms of state regulation might have the incidental effect of
increasing the cost or decreasing the availability of medical care,
whether for abortion or any other medical procedure. The fact that a
law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the
right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more
expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it.144
Moreover, the cost of an additional doctor’s visit is minimal when weighed
against the seriousness of woman’s decision regarding abortion,145 the benefits
of robust consultation, and the “risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to
discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision
was not fully informed.”146
And while the primary care consultation requirement could result in some
delay in a woman’s being able to have an abortion, the Court in Casey
determined that a delay that allows a woman to consider important information
is constitutional: “The idea that important decisions will be more informed and
deliberate if they follow some period of reflection does not strike us as
unreasonable, particularly where the statute directs that important information
become part of the background of the decision.”147 Importantly, the primary
care consultation requirement facilitates a woman’s receipt of information
tailored to her unique circumstances, thereby adding to the reasonableness of
any delay. Furthermore, the model statute contains measures designed to
obviate inherent difficulties a woman may have in getting a consultation with
her primary care physician: (i) it requires physicians to treat a woman’s request
for consultation as a request for urgent care, perhaps facilitating a woman’s
ability to get in to see her doctor on short notice and (ii) it places a 72-hour limit
on the time in which a woman must seek a consultation. If a woman makes a
diligent effort to schedule an appointment with her primary care physician and
is unable to do so within 72 hours, the consultation provision does not apply if
the woman so certifies.148 Of course, some women may be able to get in to see
their doctors more quickly, but for those who cannot do so, the model statute
offers a reasonable limit.149
144. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
145. Id. at 873 (describing the decision to have an abortion as one that has “profound and
lasting meaning”).
146. Id. at 882.
147. Id. at 885.
148. See Model Statute, infra APPENDIX Sec. 3(b) (“The requirements under Section 3(a)(i)
shall not apply if, prior to the abortion, the physician who will perform the abortion receives from
the woman a written certification that the woman . . . has been unable to schedule an appointment
for urgent care with her primary ob/gyn for a time within 72 hours of her first attempt to schedule
of her first attempt to schedule such an appointment.”).
149. The 72-hour limit is consistent with waiting period recently adopted in some states. See
State Policies in Brief, Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE
(Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf (indicating that
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Fifth, while imposing the consultation requirement may express a preference
for childbirth over abortion, Casey permits expression of this preference based
on the State’s interest in protecting potential life: “under the undue burden
standard a State is permitted to enact persuasive measures which favor childbirth
over abortion, even if those measures do not further a health interest.”150 In this
respect, the primary care consultation requirement is less burdensome than the
Pennsylvania informed consent provision at issue in Casey151 because, unlike
the Pennsylvania law, the model statute does not control what a physician shares
with a woman, and as one abortion provider states, “most OB/GYN[s] are
supportive of all reproduction choices, including abortion.” 152 Moreover,
because of the anti-kickback provision in the model statute, a woman is more
likely to receive medical advice free from any underlying financial bias in favor
of abortion.153
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for abortion rights advocates, the
primary care consultation requirement does not prevent a woman from making
“the ultimate decision.”154 The requirement is designed to inform a woman’s
choice, not to impede it—the model statute is explicit that a woman remains free
to choose abortion against her primary care physician’s advice and to have an
abortion performed by a doctor of her choosing. 155 Thus, like the informed
Missouri, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah require a 72-hour waiting period before a woman
has an abortion). And in a 2011 lawsuit, the plaintiffs dropped their challenge with respect to South
Dakota’s 72-hour waiting period. See Order Dissolving in Part and Continuing in Part the Modified
Preliminary Injunction, Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Daugaard,
Civ. 11-4071-KES, at 2 (D.S.D. June 11, 2013) (indicating that the plaintiffs dismissed their claim
with respect to South Dakota’s 72-hour waiting period).
150. Casey, 505 U.S. at 886. See also id. at 878 (noting that, unless it imposes an undue burden,
“a state measure designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if
reasonably related to that goal”), 883 (“[W]e permit a State to further its legitimate goal of
protecting the life of the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature
and informed, even when in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over
abortion.”).
151. See id. at 844.
152. Questions, supra note 70. See also Amy Norton, Few U.S. ob-gyns provide abortions:
study, REUTERS (Sept. 1, 2011, 1:12pm), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/01/us-abortionsidUSTRE7804JN20110901 (indicating that the issue is “not that large numbers of doctors ‘don’t
believe in abortion’”).
153. Of course, a primary care physician may not be immune entirely from financial incentives
because, in the course of the consultation, the physician might propose that the physician himself
or herself perform the abortion. But evidence indicates that most ob/gyns who provide
comprehensive services do not perform abortions. See Norton, supra note 152 (“Only a small
percentage of ob-gyns offer abortion services, despite a high demand for them.”).
154. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
155. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (“A statute [whose purpose is to create a substantial obstacle]
is invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be
calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”). See also Model Statute, infra
APPENDIX Sec. 3.
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consent provision in Casey,156 the primary care consultation requirement offers
a woman the opportunity to be better informed, while respecting the freedom to
choose that the Court recognized in Roe and Casey.157
Therefore, the primary care consultation requirement and the informed
consent and waiting period provisions in Casey share similar attributes.158 At
the same time, the consultation requirement is markedly different from the
spousal notification provision that the Casey Court struck down and the
admitting privileges and ambulatory surgery center requirements the Hellerstedt
Court declared unconstitutional.
In Casey, the Court determined that the spousal notification requirement
imposed an undue burden because of the specter that a woman would choose not
to have abortion because she feared that she would be abused, that her children
would be abused, or that her decision would be shared with others.159 These
concerns are virtually non-existent with respect to the primary care consultation
requirement. It would seem extremely rare for a woman to fear physical or
psychological abuse from her primary care physician. And given the ethical
obligations of doctors to maintain patient confidentiality160 and the significant
legal limitations on disclosing personal health information,161 it is very unlikely
that a woman would have a reasonable fear that her decision would be disclosed
to others without her consent. Moreover, mindful of confidentiality concerns,
the model statute requires primary care physicians to notify women of their right
to revoke any consent they previously provided regarding the disclosure of
personal health information and to facilitate the process of revoking any such

156. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
157. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Casey, 505 U.S. at 859.
158. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 844; Model Statute, infra APPENDIX Sec. 3.
159. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 893 (“Many may have justifiable fears of physical abuse . . . .
Many may have a reasonable fear that notifying their husbands will provoke further instances of
child abuse . . . . Many may fear devastating forms of psychological abuse from their husbands,
including . . . disclosure of the abortion to family and friends.”).
160. See AMA Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 10.01 – Fundamental Elements of the PatientPhysician Relationship, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion1001.page (last visited Mar. 5,
2016) (“The patient has the right to confidentiality. The physician should not reveal confidential
communications or information without the consent of the patient, unless provided for by law or
by the need to protect the welfare of the individual or the public interest.”).
161. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 1177, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320d-6 (2012) (imposing penalties for disclosing “individually identifiable health information”).
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consent. 162 Therefore, the primary care consultation requirement hardly
represents an “effective veto” over the woman’s decision to choose abortion.163
The model statute likewise is free from the problems the Court identified in
Hellerstedt. The Hellerstedt Court determined that Texas’s admitting privileges
and ambulatory surgery center requirements conferred no benefit with respect to
maternal health because they would not make abortion any safer and that they
imposed significant burdens by causing abortion facilities to close, thereby
leaving an insufficient number of clinics to meet demand, causing overcrowded
facilities and increased waiting times, and denying women the ability to receive
meaningful consultation. 164 Even if one concluded that the health-related
benefits of the primary care consultation requirement were merely speculative,
the consultation requirement nevertheless advances the state’s interest in
protecting unborn life by assisting a woman in making an informed decision, a
benefit sufficient to support the informed consent and waiting period provisions
in Casey.165 Moreover, the primary care consultation requirement will not result
in any clinic closures (except perhaps those that are unsafe, if primary care
physicians regularly steer women away from them), and rather than denying
women individual attention and care, the requirement facilitates those things.166
Indeed, the only burdens the requirement imposes are those that the Court in
Casey determined were not undue. 167
Before Hellerstedt, however, the U.S. District Court for the District of South
Dakota in Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v.
Daugaard168 invoked Casey’s undue burden standard to enjoin a consultation
requirement of a different sort—one that required a visit to a “pregnancy help
center.”169 Daugaard involved a South Dakota statute that barred a physician
from performing an abortion for a woman unless the physician first obtained the
162. See Model Statute, infra APPENDIX Sec. 4(b) (providing that a doctor “shall inform the
woman of her right to withhold consent to disclosure to third parties of the substance of any
information discussed during the course of the consultation and shall provide the woman with such
forms as may be necessary to revoke any consent previously given that otherwise would authorize
the physician to make such disclosures.”). Of course, this provision would not apply to primary
care physicians located outside the State imposing the consultation obligation, but it seems likely
that physicians on their own—and mindful of patient concerns—would remind women of their
ability to revoke consent.
163. Casey, 505 U.S. at 897.
164. See supra notes 121–25 and accompanying text (discussing Hellerstedt).
165. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 885 (indicating that requiring time for reflection is reasonable,
particularly when important information is made available).
166. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2312–14, 2316–18 (2016)
(discussing evidence that the Texas regulations caused clinic closures and the burdens associated
with such closures).
167. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text (discussing the costs and delay associated
with the primary care consultation requirement).
168. 799 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (D.S.D. 2011).
169. Id. at 1063.
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woman’s written certification that she had consulted with a “pregnancy help
center,” a term the law defined to mean an entity that offers services to encourage
pregnancy over abortion, does not itself perform abortions, is not affiliated with
an abortion provider, and does not make referrals for abortions. 170 Planned
Parenthood and a physician challenged the law, claiming that it posed an undue
burden on a woman’s right to choose and therefore was invalid under Casey.171
The district court agreed, finding that the pregnancy help center consultation
requirement was relevant only to those women “who have chosen to undergo an
abortion and would otherwise not consult with a pregnancy help center,”172 and
that for a “large fraction” of those women, the requirement constituted a
substantial obstacle to choosing abortion.173 According to the court:
Forcing a woman to divulge to a stranger at a pregnancy help center
the fact that she has chosen to undergo an abortion humiliates and
degrades her as a human being. The woman will feel degraded by the
compulsive nature of the Pregnancy Help Center Requirements, which
suggest that she has made the “wrong” decision, has not really
“thought” about her decision to undergo an abortion, or is “not
intelligent enough” to make the decision with the advice of a
physician. . . . Furthermore, these women are forced into a hostile
environment. . . . [S]he will fear being ridiculed, labeled a murderer,
subjected to anti-abortion ideology, and repeatedly contacted by the
pregnancy help center. Moreover, a woman may likely believe . . .
that her decision to have abortion could become public information.174
While the district court’s analysis may hold some appeal, the court missed the
mark in a number of significant respects. First, by taking into account only those
women who have “chosen to undergo an abortion,” 175 the court defined the
relevant class of women more narrowly than is appropriate under Casey. Casey
included those women “seeking abortion”176 and thus included women who may
be planning to have an abortion, but who have not yet made up their minds.
Second, the court in Daugaard relies on assumptions about what women will
experience and fear from the pregnancy help center consultation requirement,177
170. See id. at 1053–54 (detailing the requirements of the South Dakota statute).
171. Id. at 1054.
172. Id. at 1060.
173. See id. at 1063 (concluding that the pregnancy help center consultation requirement would
represent a substantial obstacle to abortion and would do so with respect to a “large fraction” of
women to whom it was relevant).
174. Id. at 1060.
175. Id. at 1059.
176. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992) (emphasis added). The
Daugaard opinion even acknowledges the broader scope employed by Casey. See Daugaard, 799
F. Supp. 2d at 1062 (quoting Casey’s description of the relevant class).
177. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1060.
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rather than on extensive evidence of the type that the Casey Court considered in
striking down Pennsylvania’s spousal notification requirement and that the
Court in Hellerstedt detailed when it invalidated Texas’s admitting privileges
and ambulatory surgery center requirements.178 Moreover, the degradation that
the court posits in Daugaard is not of the same magnitude as the risk of abuse
the Court in Casey emphasized. 179 Third, the Daugaard court ignores the
important distinction between spousal notification and parental consent
requirements, which have implications for continuing relationships with
inherent power disparities that realistically could transform a condition into an
effective ban,180 and the pregnancy help center consultation requirement, which
(except in rare cases) involves third parties a woman may never see again.
Fourth, the court does not consider the financial incentives a physician has when
recommending a procedure he or she will perform181 and the subtle pressure a
woman therefore may experience when she approaches a physician to perform
an abortion for her. A consultation with a pregnancy help center—which the
South Dakota law required to be staffed with a physician subject to his or her
own ethical duties 182 and who would not have the financial incentives an
abortion specialist would—could serve as important countermeasure against this
pressure. Finally, in determining that the pregnancy help center consultation
requirement would affect a large fraction of women to whom it is relevant, the
court in Daugaard merely repeats the concerns underlying its conclusion that
the South Dakota statute would create a substantial obstacle, asserts that those
concerns affect nearly all of the women in the relevant class, and then summarily
concludes: “As a result, women will delay or refrain from consulting with the
pregnancy help centers, which will prevent them from being able to carry out
their decision to undergo an abortion.” 183 Put simply, the district court in
Daugaard does not engage in the detailed analysis above regarding the primary
care consultation requirement in the model statute, analysis that in large measure
applies equally to the pregnancy help center consultation requirement.
Nevertheless, even if the district court’s conclusion regarding the South
Dakota statute were correct, the primary care consultation requirement is
178. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 888–94 (describing extensive district court findings and supporting
evidence); Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310–18 (2016) (same).
179. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 893.
180. See id. at 894 (indicating that the Court “must not blind [itself] to the fact that the
significant number of women who fear for their safety and the safety of their children are likely to
be deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in
all cases.”).
181. See supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text (discussing the inherent financial bias
present when a physician proposes a procedure from which the physician will profit).
182. See Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1053 (defining the term “pregnancy help center” to
include an entity that is staffed by a “medical director who is licensed to practice medicine in the
state of South Dakota”).
183. Id. at 1063.
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different from South Dakota’s pregnancy help center consultation requirement
in important respects. First, under the primary care consultation requirement, a
woman is not required to divulge information about her pregnancy and her plan
to have an abortion to a stranger, but instead to a physician known to her and in
whom she presumably has placed some measure of trust with respect to her
health. Second, while the South Dakota law contained specific parameters for
the required consultation and contemplated the delivery of information about
assistance she might obtain if she were to choose to maintain her pregnancy,184
the primary care consultation requirement does not dictate what views a primary
care physician must have or what information he or she must share.185 Thus, the
primary care consultation requirement would not suggest anything about a
woman’s intelligence or her decision to have an abortion. Third, it is hard to see
how the primary care consultation requirement would subject a woman to
hostility or cause her reasonably to fear “being ridiculed, labeled a murderer,
subjected to anti-abortion ideology, [or] repeatedly contacted”186 by her primary
care physician. Medical ethics standards require physicians to treat patients with
“courtesy, respect, [and] dignity,”187 and as the Court asserted in Doe, “the good
physician . . . will have sympathy and understanding for the pregnant patient that
probably are not exceeded by those who participate in other areas of professional
counseling.”188 In addition, if one can rely on State licensing requirements to
ensure that abortion providers exercise an appropriate level of judgment,189 one
should be able to rely on these very same requirements to protect a woman from
hostility, ridicule, or other inappropriate behavior by her primary care physician.
Fourth, even if a woman might be concerned about the sufficiency of the
confidentiality protections included in South Dakota’s pregnancy help center
consultation requirement,190 she should have little fear of public disclosure by

184. See id. at 1053–54 (quoting Section 3(a) of the South Dakota statute, which specifies the
content of the required consultation).
185. See Model Statute, infra APPENDIX Sec. 3.
186. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1060.
187. Opinion 10.01 – Fundamental Elements of the Patient-Physician Relationship, AM. MED.
ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethi
cs/opinion1001.page (last visited Mar. 5, 2016) [hereinafter Fundamental Elements].
188. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197 (1973).
189. See id. at 199 (“If a physician is licensed by the State, he is recognized by the State as
capable of exercising acceptable clinical judgment. If he fails in this, professional censure and
deprivation of his license are available remedies.”).
190. While the South Dakota statute permitted a pregnancy help center to forward to the
abortion provider any assessment it might have made in connection with the consultation, it
otherwise prohibited disclosure of information as to the consultation unless authorized by the
woman or required by law. See Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1054 (describing the provision of
the South Dakota statute governing disclosure of information).

744

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 65:713

her physician in light of the ethical and legal obligations physicians have with
respect to confidential medical information.191
The primary care consultation requirement, therefore, does not raise the same
issues the flawed Daugaard decision highlighted. Absent also are concerns of
the type the Supreme Court in Casey and Hellerstedt expressed with respect to
Pennsylvania’s spousal notification requirement and Texas’s admitting
privileges and ambulatory surgery center requirements.192 Instead, the primary
care consultation requirement shares common ground with the informed consent
and waiting period provisions at issue in Casey.193 Consequently, it fits firmly
within the constitutional bounds established by the Supreme Court.
2. Doe v. Bolton
Despite Casey’s abandonment of Roe’s trimester framework in favor of an
undue burden standard for pre-viability abortion regulations,194 the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio in a post-Casey opinion looked to Doe
v. Bolton,195 Roe’s companion case,196 when the district court enjoined an Ohio
law that required a second physician to concur in a determination of the necessity
of a post-viability abortion.197 Therefore, a thorough constitutional analysis of
the primary care consultation requirement must consider the continuing vitality
of Doe and its treatment of a physician concurrence requirement that was similar
to Ohio’s, but applied throughout a woman’s pregnancy.
In Doe, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a Georgia statute that
prohibited a physician from performing an abortion for a woman unless two
other physicians examined the woman and confirmed the medical judgment of
the physician who was to perform the abortion.198 Striking down the law, the
Court determined that the concurrence requirement did not serve the needs of a
woman seeking an abortion and impermissibly interfered with the exercise of
191. See Fundamental Elements, supra note 187 (“The patient has the right to confidentiality.
The physician should not reveal confidential communications or information without the consent
of the patient, unless provided for by law or by the need to protect the welfare of the individual or
the public interest.”); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 1177, 42
U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2012) (imposing penalties for disclosing “individually identifiable health
information”).
192. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–98 (1992); Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310–18 (2016).
193. See id. at 887.
194. Id. at 873, 876.
195. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
196. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973) (indicating that Roe and Doe “are to be read
together.”).
197. See Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1087–88 (S.D. Ohio
1995) aff’d 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997) (applying Doe and finding substantial likelihood that
physician concurrence requirement was unconstitutional).
198. Doe, 410 U.S. at 192.
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the physician’s medical judgment. 199 According to the Court, a physician’s
license testified to his or her ability to exercise sound medical judgment, and
should the physician fail to do so, “professional censure and deprivation of his
license are available remedies.”200
In deciding Doe, it is apparent that the Court applied Roe’s trimester
framework. The Court intended that Roe and Doe “be read together,”201 and Roe
made this point explicitly right after summarizing its trimester framework.202
Indeed, in striking down a Georgia requirement that abortions be performed in
an accredited hospital, the Court in Doe cited its inconsistency with the trimester
framework, 203 and while not mentioning the framework by name when
discussing the physician concurrence requirement, the Court noted that the
“[r]isks during the first trimester of pregnancy are admittedly lower than during
later months.” 204 If Casey discarded Roe’s trimester framework, then, it is
Casey’s undue burden standard that now would apply when determining the
constitutionality of a physician concurrence requirement, 205 and it is this
standard that would apply to the primary care consultation requirement as well.
199. See id. at 199.
200. Id.
201. Doe v. Deschamps, 461 F. Supp. 682, 688 (D. Mont. 1976).
202. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 165 (“In Doe . . . procedural requirements contained in one of the
modern abortion statutes are considered. That opinion and this one, of course, are to be read
together.”).
203. See Doe, 410 U.S. at 195 (“We hold that the hospital requirement of the Georgia law,
because it fails to exclude the first trimester of pregnancy . . . is also invalid.” (citing Roe, 410 U.S.
at 163)).
204. Id. at 198.
205. Given that Casey preserved Roe’s standard for post-viability abortion regulations, see
Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (“We also reaffirm Roe’s holding that ‘subsequent to viability, the State . .
. may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.’” (quoting
Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65)), the district court in Voinovich was not unreasonable in considering Doe
post-Casey. The district court in Voinovich erred, however, by failing to appreciate the fact that
the Court in Doe struck down a physician concurrence requirement that applied throughout a
woman’s pregnancy and not one, like the Ohio statute, that only applied post-viability, when a State
has wide latitude to regulate abortion and even can adopt a ban so long as appropriate exceptions
are made. In reaching its decision, the court in Voinovich did not even mention the U.S. District
Court for the District of Montana’s 1976 decision in Doe v. Deschamps to uphold a Montana statute
that required two additional physicians to concur before a doctor could perform a post-viability
abortion aimed at preserving a woman’s life or health. See Deschamps, 461 F. Supp. at 687, 687–
88 (describing the Montana law and concluding that it was valid). While it considered the Missouri
law’s constitutionality “a close question,” the court in Deschamps was persuaded to sustain the law
based on the prominence of the State’s interest in potential life post-viability and the fact that, for
post-viability bans, Roe’s exceptions for circumstances when a woman’s life or health relied on
“appropriate medical judgment”—presumably an objective standard—while first-trimester
abortions were left to the subjective judgment of the physician performing the abortion. See
Deschamps, 461 F. Supp. at 688 (distinguishing Roe’s treatment of regulations during different
stages of pregnancy); but see Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 196–97 (E.D. La. 1980)
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Admittedly, when invalidating a statute requiring the approval of a hospital
committee before a physician could perform an abortion, Doe almost
foreshadowed the Casey standard by describing the approval requirement as
“unduly restrictive of the patient’s rights.”206 Similarly, the Court in Whalen v.
Roe suggests that, in applying Roe’s trimester framework, Doe may have
employed an undue burden-like standard:
The statutory restrictions on the abortion procedures [at issue in Doe]
were invalid because they encumbered the woman’s exercise of that
constitutionally protected right by placing obstacles in the path of the
doctor upon whom she was entitled to rely for advice in connection
with her decision. If those obstacles had not impacted upon the
woman’s freedom to make a constitutionally protected decision, if they
had merely made the physician’s work more laborious or less
independent without any impact on the patient, they would not have
violated the Constitution.207
A physician concurrence requirement similar to the one at issue in Doe,
therefore, may not survive Casey’s undue burden standard.208
This conclusion, however, does not spell doom for the primary care
consultation requirement, which is fundamentally different from a requirement
that another physician concur in the decision to perform an abortion. First, the
consultation requirement is designed not to inform the physician performing an
abortion, but the woman based on her particular circumstances—a concern that
lies at the very heart of Casey. 209 Second, unlike a physician concurrence
requirement, which gives another person an effective veto over a woman’s
decision, the primary care consultation requirement in the model statute
explicitly preserves a woman’s right to make the ultimate decision.210 Third, the
consultation requirement does not affect a physician’s discretion. While the
(striking down a physician concurrence requirement based on Doe). Before Casey, the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Wynn v. Scott engaged Deschamps, but disagreed,
finding that an Illinois statute that required consultation with two other physicians “ha[d] no rational
connection to either the patient’s or the fetus’s needs.” Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1320
(N.D. Ill. 1978). In reaching this decision, the court indicated that “it [was] necessary to scrutinize
[the statute] to determine whether it [was] narrowly drawn,” id. at 1319, an exacting standard of
review that seems inconsistent with a State’s right to ban abortion post-viability. If a State can ban
abortion entirely based on its interest in protecting potential life, however, it is hard to see why
necessity would be required for lesser regulations.
206. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 198 (1973) (emphasis added).
207. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604–05 n.33 (1976) (emphasis added).
208. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874–75.
209. See id. at 873 (“States are free to enact laws to provide a reasonable framework for a
woman to make a decision that has such profound and lasting meaning.”).
210. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text (describing the model statute’s specific
provision acknowledging that a woman retains the right to choose abortion notwithstanding
contrary advice from her primary care physician).
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Georgia statute at issue in Doe prohibited a physician from performing an
abortion unless two other physicians concurred,211 under the model statute, an
abortion provider need not pay heed to a recommendation the woman’s primary
care physician might offer. Just as a woman can decide to have an abortion
against the advice of her primary care physician, a physician can perform an
abortion for a woman even if the woman’s primary care physician considers the
procedure ill-advised. Thus, the primary care consultation requirement presents
none of the issues that caused the Court in Doe to strike down Georgia’s
physician concurrence requirement. 212 Instead, the consultation requirement
falls squarely within the bounds of Casey and, consequently, on solid
constitutional ground.213
B. The Primary Care Consultation Requirement Does Not Implicate a
Woman’s First Amendment Right to Be Free from Compelled Speech
As the Supreme Court pointed out in Wooley v. Maynard,214 “the right of
freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action
includes . . . the right to refrain from speaking.”215 The plaintiffs in Daugaard
challenged South Dakota’s pregnancy help center consultation requirement on
this basis as well,216 and as an alternative to its decision regarding the plaintiffs’
Fourteenth Amendment claim, the district court enjoined the requirement on
First Amendment grounds, finding that the requirement impermissibly
compelled a woman to disclose to a stranger that the woman is pregnant, that
she is going to have an abortion, that she has spoken with a physician about
performing the abortion, and the name of that physician. 217 Given that the
primary care consultation requirement under the model statute implicitly would
require a woman to speak in similar ways—to set up an appointment with her
doctor, to tell her doctor that she is pregnant and considering an abortion, and to
request that the doctor give her a referral to a doctor to perform the procedure—
one might anticipate a similar First Amendment challenge. Yet, once again, the
district court in Daugaard missed the mark in its constitutional analysis, and
even if the court were correct, the primary care consultation requirement and the
211. Doe, 410 U.S. at 183–84.
212. See id. at 199–200 (reasoning that no other surgical procedure required confirmation by
two other physicians in Georgia and that the concurrence infringed on the physician’s right to
practice and was unrelated to the patient’s needs).
213. See discussion, supra Section II.A.1 (discussing application of the undue burden standard
in Casey in the context of the model statute).
214. 420 U.S. 705 (1977).
215. Id. at 714.
216. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1054–55
(D.S.D. 2011).
217. Id. at 1056. The court also suggested that the consultation requirement impermissibly
compelled a woman to speak by requiring a woman to participate in an interview, which by its very
nature requires a person to answer questions. Id.
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South Dakota pregnancy health center consultation requirement are different in
constitutionally significant ways. The primary care consultation requirement,
therefore, would withstand a First Amendment challenge.
To analyze the constitutionality of compelled statements under the First
Amendment, a court must engage in a two-step process.218 First, the court must
determine whether the First Amendment is implicated.219 Second, if the First
Amendment is implicated, the court must then determine the proper standard of

218. See Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1055 (recognizing the two-step process for considering
compelled speech). The Court in Casey applied this two-step process in upholding the
Pennsylvania informed consent requirements against a First Amendment challenge brought by
physicians:
To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, but only
as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the
State. We see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide
the information mandated by the State here.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884–85 (1992) (citations omitted). Thus,
the Court first determined that the informed consent requirements implicated the First Amendment
and then concluded that the requirements satisfied the applicable standard of review.
Federal circuit courts have disagreed as to the standard of review the Casey Court applied.
Compare Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 249 (4th Cir. 2014), cert denied 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015)
(asserting that “Casey does not . . . announce the proper level of scrutiny to be applied to abortion
regulations that compel speech to the extraordinary extent present here . . . [and] did not hold
sweepingly that all regulation of speech in the medical context merely receives rational basis
review”), with Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 575 (5th
Cir. 2012) (indicating that “[t]he plurality response to the compelled speech claim is clearly not a
strict scrutiny analysis[;] . . . [t]he three sentences with which the Court disposed of the First
Amendment claims are, if anything, the antithesis of strict scrutiny”); Planned Parenthood Minn.,
N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 733–34 (8th Cir. 2008) (discussing how in Casey, “the Court
found no violation of the physician’s right not to speak, without need for further analysis of whether
the requirements were narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, where physicians
merely were required to give ‘truthful, non-misleading information’ relevant to the patient’s
decision”), and Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1231 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying rational basis
review and citing Casey as support).
219. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715–16 (“Identifying the Maynards’ interests as implicating First
Amendment protections does not end our inquiry however. We must also determine whether the
State’s countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to justify requiring appellees to display the
state motto on their license plates.” (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968));
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650–51 (1985) (determining that
compelled statements implicate the First Amendment before considering whether they survive
rational basis review).
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review—strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis220—and whether
the regulation at issue satisfies that standard.221
How one applies this two-step process to a particular regulation depends on
the context of the speech,222 and in this regard, the Supreme Court has addressed
220. In First Amendment free speech cases, the Court has employed these three different levels
of review, depending on the circumstances. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011)
(stating that “[n]ot all speech is of equal First Amendment importance, . . . and where matters of
purely private significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are often less rigorous”)
(internal citation omitted); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988)
(“Our lodestars in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to a compelled statement must be the
nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect of the compelled statement thereon.”). To
survive strict scrutiny, a State measure regulating speech must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715–16 (considering a State statute that
required individuals to display a license plate with an ideological message and indicating that the
Court “must . . . determine whether the State’s countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to
justify requiring appellees to display the state motto on their license plates”); Riley, 487 U.S. at 798
(considering the effect of a compelled factual statement on charitable solicitations and concluding
that the State’s proffered interest “is not as weighty as the State asserts, and that the means chosen
to accomplish it are unduly burdensome and not narrowly tailored”). Under intermediate scrutiny,
the government must establish that it has a substantial interest supporting the regulation and that
“the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, . . . and . . . is no[] more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). See also Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618,
624 (1995) (noting that the test for commercial speech under Central Hudson “consist[s] of three
related prongs: First, the government must assert a substantial interest in support of its regulation;
second, the government must demonstrate that the restriction on commercial speech directly and
materially advances that interest; and third, the regulation must be “‘narrowly drawn.’”); Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)
(“We have often approved [time, place, and manner restrictions on commercial speech] provided
that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a
significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample alternative channels
for communication of the information.”). Finally, the Court’s permissive rational basis standard
requires only that the regulation be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. See
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (holding that “an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as
disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of
consumers”); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 269 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (describing
the rational basis test as one of “reasonableness”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Under our rational basis standard of review, ‘legislation is presumed
to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.’”) (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985)); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 406 (1992) (White, J., concurring)
(describing rational basis review as requiring a regulation to be “rationally related to a legitimate
government interest.”).
221. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715–16.
222. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 798 (indicating that the standard of review in compelled speech
cases depends on the context of the compelled statements). See also Scott W. Gaylord & Thomas
J. Molony, Casey and a Woman’s Right to Know: Ultrasounds, Informed Consent, and the First
Amendment, 45 CONN. L. REV. 595, 613 (2012) (stating that “Casey was similar to Wooley in
which the context of the compelled speech, not the particular mode of expression, was
constitutionally significant.”).
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three distinct categories of compelled speech regulations, treating each category
in a different way. The Court considered the first category in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette and Wooley, which involved regulations that
compelled ideological speech, speech about “politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion.”223 Not surprisingly, regulations of this type implicate
the First Amendment and are subject to strict scrutiny.224 The second category
consists of compelled speech requirements that either alter or chill speech that a
person otherwise might wish to make. Riley v. National Federation of the Blind
of North Carolina, Inc. 225 and Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel 226
considered requirements of this type, and in both cases, the Court concluded that
the First Amendment was implicated.227 In Riley, the Court determined that
strict scrutiny applied to compelled statements affecting fully-protected
speech,228 but in Zauderer, the Court held that rational basis review may apply
to compelled statements that affect commercial speech, which receives less First
Amendment protection. 229 The final category of compelled speech includes
government-required speech requirements that are incidental to the regulation of
conduct and that neither require ideological speech nor chill protected speech a
person otherwise might make. 230 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights, Inc.231 teaches that these regulations do not implicate the
First Amendment at all, and it is in this final category that the speech implicitly
compelled under the primary care consultation requirement falls.232
Barnette and Wooley make clear that the First Amendment bars a State from
requiring one to deliver publicly the State’s ideological message. 233 As the
Court put it in Barnette: “if there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”234
223. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714–15; W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943).
224. See Donald L. Beschle, Clearly Canadian? Hill v. Colorado and Free Speech Balancing
in the United States and Canada, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 187, 191 (2001) (explaining that “strict
scrutiny or some variant of it would be appropriate where government attempted to censor or punish
speech, or regulate it on the basis of its content”); Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715–16.
225. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
226. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
227. Riley, 487 U.S. at 794; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
228. Riley, 487 U.S. at 788–89.
229. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650–51 & n.14.
230. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61–62, 64 (2006).
231. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
232. Id. at 61–62, 64.
233. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1977); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
234. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
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The Barnette Court considered a First Amendment challenge to a state board
of education requirement that school children salute the U.S. flag while reciting
the pledge of allegiance.235 In assessing the challenge, the Court framed the
issue as whether the government has the “power to force an American citizen
publicly to profess a[] statement of belief or to engage in a[] ceremony of assent
to one.”236 The Court concluded that the government does not have this power
because exercising it would “invade[] the sphere of intellect and spirit which it
is the purpose of the First Amendment . . . to reserve from all official control.”237
The Court in Wooley addressed a similar challenge to a New Hampshire
statute that required motorists to display the State’s motto “Live Free or Die” on
their license plates, a requirement the plaintiffs—Jehovah’s Witnesses—
claimed was contrary to “their moral, religious, and political beliefs.” 238 In
determining that the compulsion implicated the First Amendment, the Court
admitted that the State’s infringement was not as extreme as that considered in
Barnette, but the Court determined nevertheless that it “forc[ed] an individual,
as part of his daily life - indeed constantly while his automobile is in public view
- to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of
view he finds unacceptable.”239 Accordingly, the Court applied strict scrutiny
to strike down the statute, concluding that “where the State’s interest is to
disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot
outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier
for such message.”240
In contrast to Barnette and Wooley, Riley did not involve matters of ideology
or opinion, but rather a requirement under North Carolina law that professional
fundraisers make a purely factual disclosure—“the gross percentage of revenues
retained in prior charitable solicitations”241—in the course of soliciting donors.
According to the Riley Court, that the compelled disclosure was one of fact and
not one of opinion was inapposite: “[Previous compelled speech cases] cannot
be distinguished simply because they involved compelled statements of opinion
while here we deal with compelled statements of ‘fact’: either form of
compulsion burdens protected speech.”242 The Court’s concern with compelled
statements of fact, though, was the effect of the compelled statements on
otherwise fully-protected speech. In determining that the compelled statements
implicated the First Amendment, the Court in Riley pointed out that
“[m]andating speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. at 628–30.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 642.
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 717.
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 784 (1988).
Id. at 797–98.
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the content of the speech.”243 Likewise, the Court determined that strict scrutiny
applied because the compelled factual statements were “inextricably intertwined
with otherwise fully protected speech” 244 —charitable solicitations—and
notably, the examples the Court gave of other impermissible compelled
statements of fact both related to fully-protected political speech:
[W]e would not immunize a law requiring a speaker favoring a
particular government project to state at the outset of every address the
average cost overruns in similar projects, or a law requiring a speaker
favoring an incumbent candidate to state during every solicitation that
candidate’s recent travel budget. Although the foregoing factual
information might be relevant to the listener, and, in the latter case,
could encourage or discourage the listener from making a political
donation, a law compelling its disclosure would clearly and
substantially burden the protected speech.245
The Court in Riley emphasized that context matters: “Our lodestars in
deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to a compelled statement must be the
nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect of the compelled statement
thereon.”246 The First Amendment was implicated in Riley because the
compelled statements were required in a context in which other protected speech
was to be made, with the result that the compelled statements would affect the
content of the other speech. 247 And because the other protected speech was
entitled to the most robust First Amendment protection, strict scrutiny applied
to the compelled statements.248
While the Court in Riley recognized that there are differences between
regulations restricting a person’s speech and those requiring a person to speak,
the Court determined that, in the context of statements that alter fully-protected
speech, the distinction did not affect the standard of review.249 Riley conceded,

243. Id. at 795 (emphasis added).
244. Id. at 796.
245. Id. at 798.
246. Id. at 796.
247. See id.
248. See id. at 798 (applying “exacting First Amendment scrutiny” to a law that required
factual disclosures that would burden fully-protected speech).
249. Id. at 796 (“There is certainly some difference between compelled speech and compelled
silence, but in the context of protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance
. . . . ”). The Court rejected the State’s argument that, because the fundraiser’s speech had financial
implications, the Court should not apply strict scrutiny to the compelled statements, but instead
should apply the lower level of scrutiny applicable to commercial speech. See id. at 795–96 (“The
State argues that . . . this portion of the Act regulates only commercial speech. . . . [, but] where . .
. the component parts of a single speech are inextricably intertwined, we cannot parcel out the
speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to another phrase.”).
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however, that a different standard of review might apply in another context. 250
In doing so, the Court referred to Zauderer, a case in which the distinction
between restrictions on speech and compelled speech did matter.251
At issue in Zauderer was whether a state could require attorneys to disclose
in advertisements for their services how contingent fees would be calculated and
what costs clients would be responsible for if their claims were not successful.252
As in Riley, the Zauderer Court determined that the First Amendment was
implicated 253 because the disclosure requirements affected other speech. 254
Unlike Riley, though, the Court in Zauderer determined that rational basis
review applied to the compelled statements, 255 notwithstanding the fact that
restrictions on commercial speech typically are subject to intermediate
scrutiny.256 In arriving at this decision, the Court in Zauderer emphasized that
“the interests at stake . . . [were] not of the same order as those discussed in
Wooley . . . and Barnette” because the State “ha[d] not attempted to ‘prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.’”257
In Rumsfeld, however, the Court departed dramatically from Riley and
Zauderer and did not apply any standard of review to the compelled statements
of fact that were at issue. Rumsfeld involved a challenge to the Solomon
Amendment, a federal statute that bars federal funding of educational
institutions that do not provide military recruiters access to the institutions’
facilities and students at a level that is at least as favorable as that provided to

250. Id. at 796 n.9 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985))
(“Purely commercial speech is more susceptible to compelled disclosure requirements.”).
251. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
252. See id. at 633 (describing the required disclosures).
253. See id. at 651 (“We do not suggest that disclosure requirements do not implicate the
advertiser’s First Amendment rights at all.”).
254. See id. (“We recognize that unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements
might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech.”).
255. See id. (holding that “an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure
requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”).
256. See id. at 638 (“Commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and does not concern
unlawful activities . . . may be restricted only in the service of a substantial governmental interest,
and only through means that directly advance that interest.”).
257. Id. at 651 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). Indeed,
the interests at stake in Zauderer were not of the same order as those in Riley because the Court has
considered charitable solicitations to constitute ideological speech. See Sec’y of State of MD v.
Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 960 (1984) (“[S]olicitation is characteristically
intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes
or for particular views on economic, political, or social issues . . . . ” (quoting Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980)); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S.
781, 803 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“We have held the solicitation of money by charities to be
. . . the dissemination of ideas.”).
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other potential employers. 258 Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights
(“FAIR”), a group representing law schools and law faculties whose members
opposed the Congressional policy regarding homosexuals in the military, argued
that the statute interfered with their members’ ability to “express[] their
opposition to discrimination based on . . . sexual orientation.”259 Among other
things, FAIR contended that the Solomon Amendment’s equal access rule
impermissibly compelled law schools to speak by forcing them to “send e-mails
and post notices” for military recruiters, assistance they customarily provided to
all employers. 260 The Court, while acknowledging that the compelled
statements required consideration of the law schools’ First Amendment rights,
rejected FAIR’s claim, finding that the speech was merely incidental to the
government’s regulation of conduct and was a “far cry” from the speech at issue
in Barnette and Wooley:
The compelled speech to which the law schools point is plainly
incidental to the Solomon Amendment’s regulation of conduct, and “it
has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press
to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in
part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either
spoken, written, or printed.” . . . Compelling a law school that sends
scheduling e-mails for other recruiters to send one for a military
recruiter is simply not the same as forcing a student to pledge
allegiance, or forcing a Jehovah’s Witness to display the motto “Live
Free or Die,” and it trivializes the freedom protected in Barnette and
Wooley to suggest that it is.261
In reaching this conclusion, it was important to the Rumsfeld Court that the
Solomon Amendment did not “dictate the content of the speech at all” and only
required law schools to speak for military recruiters if they were doing so for
other employers.262
Therefore, while Riley indicates that compelled statements of fact are not
excluded from First Amendment scrutiny,263 Rumsfeld explains that Riley only
goes so far and does not mean that all compelled factual statements implicate
the First Amendment and therefore are subject to review.264 As the Ninth Circuit

258. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 51 (2006).
259. Id. at 52.
260. Id. at 61–62.
261. Id. at 62.
262. Id.
263. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797–98 (1988) (“These cases cannot
be distinguished simply because they involved compelled statements of opinion while here we deal
with compelled statements of ‘fact’: either form of compulsion burdens protected speech.”).
264. See Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 61–65 (applying neither strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny,
nor rational basis review in analyzing compelled speech claims).
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stated in Jerry Beeman and Pharmacy Services, Inc. v. Anthem Prescription
Management, LLC:265
[Rumsfeld] makes clear that not all fact-based disclosure requirements
are subject to First Amendment scrutiny. Instead, such requirements
implicate the First Amendment only if they affect the content of the
message or speech by forcing the speaker to endorse a particular
viewpoint or by chilling or burdening a message that the speaker
would otherwise choose to make.266
When one examines Barnette, Wooley, Riley, Zauderer, and Rumsfeld
together, some common threads emerge. First, whether government-compelled
speech implicates the First Amendment depends on whether the compelled
speech is itself protected or would alter or chill other speech that is protected.
In Barnette and Wooley, for example, the compelled speech itself was
ideological.267 In Riley and Zauderer, the compelled speech itself was purely

265. 652 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2011).
266. Id. at 1099–1100. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion was vacated and the case remanded back
to the Ninth Circuit panel following the response of the California Supreme Court to a certified
question regarding the interpretation of the free speech clause under the California constitution.
See Beeman v. Anthem Prescription Mgmt., LLC, 689 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2012) (certifying
question to California Supreme Court); Beeman, 741 F.3d 29, 29 (2014) (vacating earlier opinion
remanding case to Ninth Circuit panel following opinion of California Supreme Court).
Nevertheless, the vacated opinion remains instructive as to the interpretation of the First
Amendment. The California Supreme Court, however, in responding to the Ninth Circuit’s
certified question, disagreed with the federal court’s conclusion that the Court in Rumsfeld had
determined that the factual statements in that case did not implicate the First Amendment. In so
doing, the California Supreme Court focused on the Court’s statement that “the[] compelled
statements of fact . . . like compelled statements of opinion, are subject to First Amendment
scrutiny.” Beeman v. Anthem Prescription Mgmt., LLC, 315 P.3d 71, 81 (2013) (quoting Rumsfeld,
547 U.S. at 62)). The California Supreme Court, however, read Rumsfeld too literally. To be sure,
any government-compelled statement—factual or otherwise—must be examined initially to
determine if the First Amendment is implicated. Only if a court determines that the First
Amendment is implicated, though, will it employ a standard of review to determine whether the
alleged encroachment is permissible. The Court in Rumsfeld did not employ any standard of review
to evaluate FAIR’s free speech claims, as evidenced by the fact that it did not consider the
magnitude of the government’s interest or whether the Solomon Amendment was narrowly tailored,
directly related, or rationally related to the interest. See Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 61–68. Contra
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715–16 (“Identifying the Maynards’ interests as implicating First Amendment
protections does not end our inquiry however. We must also determine whether the State’s
countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to justify requiring appellees to display the state
motto on their license plates.”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (determining first that the First Amendment
was implicated, noting that a State may reasonably regulate the practice of medicine, and then
concluding that required disclosures did not violate the Constitution).
267. In Barnette, the Court repeatedly emphasized its concern about compelled affirmation of
a belief or opinion about political ideas. See W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631
(1943) (“[W]e are dealing with a compulsion of students to declare a belief.”). See also id. at 633
(noting that the requirement that students salute the flag “requires the individual to communicate
by word and sign his acceptance of the political ideas it thus bespeaks” and “requires affirmation
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factual, but affected otherwise protected speech—in Riley, fully-protected
speech soliciting donations, and in Zauderer, commercial speech. 268 In
Rumsfeld, on the other hand, the compelled speech itself was factual and had no
apparent effect on any protected message a law school might wish to convey.269
As a result, the speech did not implicate the First Amendment. Second, whether
the compelled statements directly regulate speech by dictating content or merely
are incidental to the regulation of conduct is important. In Barnette, Wooley,
Riley, and Zauderer, the government specified what the speaker had to say.270
of a belief and an attitude of mind.”), 634 (noting that the case presented the issue of the “validity
of the asserted power to force an American citizen publicly to profess any statement of belief or to
engage in any ceremony of assent . . . . ”), 635–36 (“The question which underlies the flag salute
controversy is whether such a ceremony so touching matters of opinion and political attitude may
be imposed upon the individual by official authority . . . . ”); 642 (“We think the action of the local
authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their
power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment
to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.”). The Court in Wooley noted the same
concerns. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (“The First Amendment protects the right of individuals to
hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire
commands, an idea they find morally objectionable.”).
268. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 798 (“Although the foregoing factual information might be relevant
to the listener, . . . a law compelling its disclosure would clearly and substantially burden the
protected speech.”); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (“We
recognize that unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the First
Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech.”).
269. Admittedly, the Court in Rumsfeld does not state this expressly when assessing the
constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment’s implicit requirement that law schools send e-mail
messages and post notices for military recruiters when the law schools do the same for other
employers. The Court does, however, make this point in considering the Solomon Amendment’s
implicit requirement to host recruiting events for military employers, and it does so after drawing
on cases (e.g., Tornillo and Pacific Gas) in which a government regulation forced a person to
accommodate a third party’s speech in connection with the person’s own speech. See Rumsfeld,
547 U.S. at 64 (“A law school’s . . . accommodation of a military recruiter’s message is not
compelled speech because the accommodation does not sufficiently interfere with any message of
the school.”). See also Hurley v. Irish Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 572–73 (1995) (“Since every participating unit affects the message conveyed by the private
organizers, the state courts’ application of the statute produced an order essentially requiring
petitioners to alter the expressive content of their parade.” (emphasis added)); Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) (“Compelled access like that ordered in this case
both penalizes the expression of particular points of view and forces speakers to alter their speech
to conform with an agenda they do not set.”); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
258 (1974) (“The choice of material to go into a newspaper . . . and treatment of public issues and
public officials . . . constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment.”); Rumsfeld, 547 U.S.
at 64 (indicating that the Court in Tornillo “concluded that this right-of-reply statute infringed the
newspaper editors’ freedom of speech by altering the message the paper wished to express” (citing
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258)).
270. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626 (considering a school board requirement that students recite
the pledge of allegiance); Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707 (evaluating a requirement that motorists display
license plates with New Hampshire State motto); Riley, 487 U.S. at 786 (addressing
constitutionality of statute that required professional fundraisers to disclose to potential donors
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In contrast, the Court in Rumsfeld emphasized the fact that the Solomon
Amendment did not influence the content of any statement a law school might
be required to make. 271 Third, the First Amendment is more likely to be
implicated when the government compels a person to speak publicly. Barnette
and Wooley both suggest that publicly disseminated ideological messages reflect
the heart of First Amendment protection.272 As the Court in Wooley stressed:
[W]e are faced with a state measure which forces an individual, as part
of his daily life indeed constantly while his automobile is in public view
to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point
of view he finds unacceptable. . . . New Hampshire’s statute in effect
requires that appellees use their private property as a ‘mobile billboard’
. . . . 273
Considered in light of these common threads, the primary care consultation
requirement does not implicate the First Amendment. First, the implicitly
compelled disclosures are purely factual and do not affect or risk chilling any
protected speech a woman might otherwise make or wish to make. The
statements a woman must make to fulfill the purposes of the requirement (i.e.,
telling her primary care physician that she is pregnant and is considering
abortion and requesting a referral) do not force a woman to express any
viewpoint about “politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion”274
and “[are] simply not the same as forcing a student to pledge allegiance, or
forcing a Jehovah’s Witness to display the motto ‘Live Free or Die’ . . . . ”275
Moreover, it is hard to see how a woman speaking to her primary care physician

gross receipts actually given to charities during prior 12-month period); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 629
(considering statute that required specific disclosures with respect to contingent fee arrangements).
271. See Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62 (“The Solomon Amendment, unlike the laws at issue in
[Barnette and Wooley], does not dictate the content of the speech at all . . . . ”).
272. See Pickup v. Brown 740 F.3d 1208, 1227 (9th Cir. 2014), cert denied 134 S. Ct. 2881
(2014) (“[W]here a professional is engaged in a public dialogue, First Amendment protection is at
its greatest . . . . That principle makes sense because communicating to the public on matters of
public concern lies at the core of First Amendment values.”). See also Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct.
1207, 1215 (2011) (“Speech on ‘matters of public concern’ . . . is at the heart of the First
Amendment’s protection.”) (citations omitted).
273. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (emphasis added). See also Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634 (“Hence
validity of the asserted power to force an American citizen publicly to profess any statement of
belief or to engage in any ceremony of assent to one presents questions of power that must be
considered independently of any idea we may have as to the utility of the ceremony in question.”)
(emphasis added)); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650 (“Ohio has not attempted to prevent attorneys from
conveying information to the public . . . . ”) (emphasis added).
274. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
275. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62.
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would be engaging in any protected speech that the compelled statements of fact
would alter.276
Second, the primary care consultation requirement is not a regulation directed
at speech and does not dictate the specific content of what a woman says. In
enacting the model statute, the State’s interest would not be in “disseminat[ing]
an ideology,”277 but instead in protecting both unborn life and women’s health
by making sure that women receive the robust consultation that Roe
contemplated.278 That the State’s interest is not speech-related is confirmed by
the fact that the primary care consultation requirement does not obligate a
woman to consult with a physician who holds any particular point of view with
respect to abortion, but one whom she has chosen to provide her with
comprehensive care. Some of these physicians may prefer childbirth over
abortion; others may not.279
Finally, the primary care consultation requirement does not require a woman
to make any statement publicly. 280 As the Court stated in Pacific Gas and
Electric Company v. Public Utilities Commission of California: “‘The essential
thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary
public expression of ideas . . . . There is necessarily . . . a concomitant freedom
not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of
speech in its affirmative aspect.’”281 Under the model statute, a woman must
share a few facts with and make a simple request of her chosen physician in a
medical office, where confidentiality is a way of life as required both by
professional ethics standards and federal law.282

276. If a woman were intending to deliver an anti-abortion message, then a requirement that
she disclose her plans would raise concerns of the type considered in Riley, but that seems an
extremely unlikely situation.
277. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717.
278. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
279. See Norton, supra note 152 (noting that some ob/gyns have “personal objections” to
abortions); Questions, supra note 70 (indicating that “most OB/GYN[s] are supportive of all
reproduction choices, including abortion”); Sofia Resnick, The rise of anti-abortion-rights OBGYNs, COLORADO INDEPENDENT (June 2, 2011), http://www.coloradoindependent.com /89735/
the-rise-of-anti-abortion-rights-ob-gyns (noting an emerging trend of ob/gyns who oppose abortion
and discussing efforts of medical student groups who favor choice and those who oppose it).
280. That the statements would not be made publicly is not dispositive to the First Amendment
question. Even though public statements were not required under the Pennsylvania statute at issue
in Casey, the Court concluded that the law implicated the First Amendment rights of physicians to
be free from compelled speech. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884
(1992) (considering physicians’ compelled speech claims). Intuitively, however, requiring a
private statement would be less burdensome on one’s First Amendment rights than requiring a
public one.
281. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 11 (emphasis added) (quoting
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985)).
282. See supra notes 160–63 and accompanying text.
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The primary care consultation requirement, therefore, does not implicate the
First Amendment and consequently is not subject even to rational basis
review. 283 The district court in Daugaard, though, reached the opposite
conclusion with respect to South Dakota’s pregnancy help center consultation
requirement.284 When it did so, however, it veered off course, focusing on Riley,
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 285 and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston286 and dismissing Rumsfeld.287
Riley, McIntyre, and Hurley all dealt with compelled speech that threatened
to alter protected speech parties otherwise wished to make. As discussed above,
the Court in Riley determined that a State law impermissibly required statements
in the context of charitable solicitations. 288 In Hurley, likewise, the Court
invalidated a Massachusetts public accommodation law to the extent that it
required parade organizers to include a group whose participation would deliver
a message the parade organizers did not wish to make.289 Finding that a parade
represents expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment, the Court
283. The requirement, though, certainly would satisfy rational basis review in light of the many
justifications described in Part II of this Article.
284. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D. v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1071–72 (D.S.D.
2011).
285. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
286. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
287. Even if Daugaard were correct that the South Dakota law implicated the First
Amendment, the model statute is distinguishable. In striking down the pregnancy help center
consultation requirement, the court in Daugaard suggested that the requirement compelled a
woman to disclose private information to “someone who is opposed to her decision to undergo an
abortion.” Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1056. This is not the case with respect to the model
statute, which does not dictate that a primary care physician who consults with a woman be opposed
to abortion. Physicians fall on both sides of the abortion debate. As one abortion provider states,
“most OB/GYN[s] are supportive of all reproduction choices, including abortion. . . .” Questions,
supra note 70. Notably, the American College of Obstetricians favors choice, being “committed
to improving access to abortion.” Committee Opinion, Increasing Access to Abortion, THE
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, COMMITTEE ON HEALTH CARE
FOR UNDERSERVED WOMEN (Nov. 2014), http://www.acog.org/Resources-And-Publications/
Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Health-Care-for-Underserved-Women/Increasing-Access-toAbortion. Moreover, a woman’s primary care physician is not a stranger, but instead is a person
with whom the woman has an existing professional relationship and in whom the woman has placed
some level of trust.
In addition, the model statute is distinct from the South Dakota law in that the model statute does
not require a woman to participate in an interview. See Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1056 (finding
that the South Dakota statute compelled a woman to speak by requiring her to participate in an
interview). Finally, unlike the South Dakota law, the model statute requires consultation with a
physician who is bound by professional ethics requirements and by Federal law to maintain the
confidentiality of the information provided. See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.
288. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 798 (1988).
289. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559 (finding unconstitutional a Massachusetts law that would
require a parade organizer to “include . . . a group imparting a message the organizers do not wish
to convey.”).
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emphasized that Massachusetts could not “compel a speaker to alter [his or her]
message by including one more acceptable to others.”290 Similarly, in McIntyre,
the Court struck down an Ohio election law that permitted the distribution of
campaign information only if it identified the author.291 As the Court in that
case explained, “an author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions
concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of
the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.”292 Thus, the holdings
in Riley, Hurley, and McIntyre are inapposite to the constitutionality of South
Dakota’s pregnancy help center consultation requirement, which would not
compel a woman to deliver a message that would modify other protected speech
a woman might make or wish to make.293 As a result, the Daugaard court was
wrong to rely on these precedents to support its conclusion that the South Dakota
statute implicated a woman’s First Amendment right to be free from compelled
speech.
In rejecting Rumsfeld as the controlling precedent, the court in Daugaard
stated that “there is a clear difference between ‘The U.S. Army recruiter will
meet interested students in Room 123 at 11 a.m.’ and ‘I am pregnant and have
chosen to have an abortion. The name of my abortion physician is Dr. X.’”294
The court failed to explain, however, why the difference was significant with
respect to a woman’s First Amendment freedom.
Contrary to the court’s conclusion in Daugaard, the distinction between the
compelled speech at issue in Rumsfeld and that under the pregnancy help center
consultation requirement is not meaningful from a First Amendment
perspective. Just as with the Solomon Amendment, South Dakota’s consultation
requirement did not require a woman to express a particular ideological message
or risk altering or chilling protected speech a woman otherwise might wish to
make.295 Moreover, unlike the speech at issue in Barnette, Wooley, Riley, and
Zauderer, both the Solomon Amendment and the South Dakota statute only
implicitly required speech incidental to the regulation of conduct, with neither
regulation expressly mandating what a person must say.296 Furthermore, while
the Court in Rumsfeld pointed out that the speech related to the Solomon
Amendment is compelled only to the extent that law schools offer the same type
of speech for other recruiters, this hardly raises a meaningful distinction from

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
2011).
295.
296.

Id. at 581 (emphasis added).
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 336, 357 (1995).
Id. at 342.
See Riley, 487 U.S. at 797–98; Hurley, 515 U.S. at 580–81; McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.
Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1056 (D.S.D.
See supra text accompanying note 266 (discussing Rumsfeld).
Id.
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South Dakota’s consultation requirement given the practical reality that all law
schools want to facilitate placement of their students.297
Nevertheless, the Daugaard court’s intuition was correct—there is a
difference between requiring a woman to disclose that she is pregnant and
planning to have an abortion and requiring a law school to disclose logistical
information about meeting with a military recruiter. 298 The district court’s
mistake, though, was concluding that this distinction made a difference from a
First Amendment perspective. 299 Rather than implicating a woman’s First
Amendment right to be free from compelled speech, the pregnancy help center
consultation requirement under the South Dakota statute and the primary care
consultation requirement under the model statute implicate a woman’s
Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy with respect to personal medical
information, a right that finds its genesis in Whalen v. Roe,300 a 1977 decision
that the Court in Casey cited when it considered the First Amendment claims
brought by physicians with respect to Pennsylvania’s informed consent
statute.301
Whalen involved a challenge to a New York statute that required physicians
to provide the State with duplicate copies of prescription forms (for certain
controlled substances) that included detailed personal information, such as the
“the drug and dosage[] and the name, address, and age of the patient.”302 In
considering the plaintiffs’ claims, the Court in Whalen noted two privacy
interests at stake—the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal information
and the interest in being permitted to make certain important decisions.303 The
Court in Whalen concluded that the New York statute did not unconstitutionally
infringe on either of those two interests.304
In rejecting the claim that the New York statute unconstitutionally infringed
upon patients’ interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, the Court
297. Compare Rumsfeld v. Forum for Aca. & Inst’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64–65 (2006)
with Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1052.
298. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1056.
299. Id. at 1056–57.
300. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1976) (suggesting that the Constitution protects a
person against disclosure of personal information); U.S. Citizens Ass’n v. Sebelius, 705 F.3d 588,
602 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Whalen in support of the proposition that “[s]ubstantive due process
protects an individual’s interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters, such as private
health information”); Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Commissioner, 317 F.3d 357, 369 (4th Cir.
2002) (observing that Whalen recognizes a constitutional right to privacy with respect to personal
information). But see Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 536–37 (9th Cir. 2010) (indicating that
Whalen did not specifically recognize a constitutional right to privacy of personal medical
information and that the Supreme Court never has held that such a right exists).
301. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
302. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 593.
303. Id. at 599–600.
304. Id. at 600.
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indicated that nothing in the record suggested that the statute increased the risk
of public disclosure of the information and that disclosure to State officials was
not:
meaningfully distinguishable from a host of other unpleasant
invasions of privacy that are associated with many facets of health
care[, including] . . . disclosures of private medical information to
doctors, to hospital personnel, to insurance companies, and to public
health agencies[,which] are often an essential part of modern medical
practice even when the disclosure may reflect unfavorably on the
character of the patient.305
Whatever one might conclude regarding the consultation requirement at issue
in Daugaard, the Court’s analysis in Whalen applies equally to the limited
disclosures implicitly required under the model statute. While the disclosures
associated with the primary care consultation requirement could be considered
to be an “unpleasant invasion of privacy” and some women may fear that the
disclosures will reflect on them “unfavorably,”306 such disclosures are not at all
uncommon when a person seeks medical care and they further the State’s
important interests in protecting unborn life and women’s health.307
As to the second privacy interest addressed in Whalen, the court emphasized:
[It cannot] be said that any individual has been deprived of the right to
decide independently, with the advice of his physician, to acquire and
to use needed medication. Nor does the State require access to these
drugs to be conditioned on the consent of any state official or other
third party. Within dosage limits . . . the decision to prescribe, or to
use, is left entirely to the physician and the patient.308
To paraphrase Casey, “[w]hat [was] at stake [was] the [patient’s] right to make
the ultimate decision,”309 and the New York law did not take that away. And as
discussed in Part III, the primary care consultation requirement likewise
preserves a woman’s right to choose abortion. Therefore, the model statute not
305. Id. at 602.
306. Id. Whalen’s facts—involving a physician’s disclosure of patient information—and the
substantial ability of states to regulate the practice of medicine, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 884, suggest
that a state could require a physician to disclose to a woman’s primary care physician that the
woman was pregnant and planning to have an abortion. The fact that the primary care consultation
requirement would require the woman herself to make the disclosure could raise some additional
discomfort, but should not be of constitutional significance. See Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895
F.2d 188, 194–95 (4th Cir. 1990) (upholding under strict scrutiny the requirement that employees
personally respond to a background questionnaire requesting personal financial information);
Taylor v. Best, 746 F.2d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 1984) (upholding under strict scrutiny that prisoners
disclose information about family background to psychologists).
307. See Cohen, supra note 73 (noting the importance of sharing with an ob/gyn if a woman
has had a previous abortion).
308. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603.
309. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
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only satisfies Casey’s undue burden standard,310 but also is constitutional under
Whalen.311
IV. CONCLUSION
The primary care consultation requirement thus offers numerous benefits to
women, while respecting their constitutional rights. Nonetheless, the model
statute is unlikely to please either side of the abortion debate completely. One
would expect abortion rights advocates to view the primary care consultation
requirement as yet another roadblock standing in the way of a woman’s right to
choose. Abortion opponents, on the other hand, may feel uneasy about a
woman’s consultation with a primary care physician who might have a favorable
view of abortion.
Yet, the model statute offers a valuable refuge for women faced with a
“decision . . . fraught with emotional consequences.”312 And it just might save
a life—perhaps a woman’s, perhaps an unborn child’s, perhaps the lives of both.
Therefore, those on both sides of the abortion debate should support the model
statute, and state legislatures across the country should adopt the legislation and
take an important step toward fulfilling the promise of Roe.
V. APPENDIX
MODEL STATUTE313
Section 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the “Pre-Abortion
Consultation Enhancement Act.”
Section 2. DEFINITIONS.314 The following definitions apply in this Act:
(a) Abortion – The use or prescription of any instrument, medicine, drug, or
other substance or device intentionally to terminate the pregnancy of a
woman known to be pregnant with an intention other than to do any of
the following:
(i)
increase the probability of a live birth;
(ii)
preserve the life or health of the child; or
310. Id. at 876–77.
311. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603–04.
312. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159.
313. Although drafted as a stand-alone statute, the provisions of the model easily could be
incorporated into a State’s existing informed consent law.
314. The definitions of “Abortion,” “Medical emergency,” and “Woman” are taken from N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-21.81, which is part of North Carolina’s informed consent statute. Legislators in
a State other than North Carolina may wish to modify the definitions to conform to the existing
laws of their State.
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remove a dead, unborn child who died as the result of (A) natural
causes in utero, (B) accidental trauma, or (C) a criminal assault
on the pregnant woman or her unborn child which causes the
premature termination of the pregnancy.

(b) Existing relationship – A professional relationship that began before the
pregnancy with respect to which a woman seeks an abortion, but
excluding a relationship that has been terminated for one or more
substantial reasons unrelated to the requirements of Section 3(a).
(c) Internist – An individual licensed to practice medicine in accordance with
the laws of any State or territory of the United States who is engaged in
the practice of family medicine, general pediatric medicine, general
internal
medicine,
internal
medicine/pediatrics,
or
obstetrics/gynecology.315
(d) Medical emergency – A condition which, in reasonable medical
judgment, so complicates the medical condition of the pregnant woman
as to necessitate the immediate abortion of her pregnancy to avert her
death or for which a delay will create serious risk of substantial and
irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function, not including
any psychological or emotional conditions. For purposes of this
definition, no condition shall be deemed a medical emergency if based on
a claim or diagnosis that the woman will engage in conduct which would
result in her death or in substantial and irreversible physical impairment
of a major bodily function.
(e) Ob/gyn – An individual licensed to practice medicine in accordance with
the laws of any State or territory of the United States who is engaged in
the practice of obstetrics/gynecology.
(f) Physician – An individual licensed to practice medicine in accordance
with the laws of this State.
(g) Primary ob/gyn – An ob/gyn with whom a woman has an existing
relationship for the purposes of receiving non-emergency gynecological
or obstetrical care and, if a woman has an existing relationship with more
than one such ob/gyn, the ob/gyn who has provided her with the most
comprehensive care over time.

315. Based on the disciplines of primary care identified in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-613(b).
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(h) Primary internist – An internist with whom a woman has an existing
relationship for the purposes of receiving first contact and continuing care
with respect to any undiagnosed sign, symptom, or health concern not
limited by problem, origin, organ system, or diagnosis316 and, if a woman
has an existing relationship with more than one such internist, the internist
who has provided her with the most comprehensive care over time.
(i) Primary care physician – A woman’s primary ob/gyn or, if Section 3(a)(i)
does not apply, her primary internist.
(j) Woman – A female human, whether or not she is an adult.
Section 3.
PHYSICIAN.

CONSULTATION WITH AND REFERRAL BY PRIMARY CARE

(a) Except in the case of a medical emergency, no abortion shall be
performed upon a woman in this State unless, before the performance of
the abortion, the physician who will perform the abortion has received,
(i)
if the woman has a primary ob/gyn, [clear and convincing]
[reasonably reliable] evidence of the following:
(A) that the woman consulted with her primary ob/gyn regarding
her decision to have the abortion and has requested a referral
for the purposes of performing the abortion;
(B) the recommendation of the woman’s primary ob/gyn as to the
advisability of her having an abortion or, if the primary ob/gyn
declined to make any recommendation, the fact that the
primary physician so declined,
(C) the reasons, if any, that the primary ob/gyn gave for making a
particular recommendation or declining to make a
recommendation;
(D) that the primary ob/gyn referred the woman to another
physician for the purposes of performing the abortion or
declined to make such a referral; and
(E) if the primary ob/gyn declined to make a referral to a physician
for the purposes of performing the abortion, any reasons the
primary ob/gyn gave for declining to do so.
(ii)
if the woman has a primary internist and clause (i) above does
not apply, [clear and convincing] [reasonably reliable] evidence
of the following:

316. Based on the American Academy of Family Physicians’ definition of “primary care.” See
Primary Care, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS, http://www.aafp.org/about/polic
ies/all/primary-care.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2016).
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(A) that the woman consulted with her primary internist regarding
her decision to have the abortion and has requested a referral
for the purposes of performing the abortion;
(B) the recommendation of the woman’s primary internist as to the
advisability of her having an abortion or, if the primary
internist declined to make any recommendation, the fact that
the primary physician so declined,
(C) the reasons, if any, that the primary internist gave for making a
particular recommendation or declining to make a
recommendation;
(D) that the primary internist referred the woman to another
physician for the purposes of performing the abortion or
declined to make such a referral; and
(E) if the primary internist declined to make a referral to a
physician for the purposes of performing the abortion, any
reasons the primary internist gave for declining to do so.
(b) The requirements under Section 3(a) shall not apply if the physician who
performs the abortion is the woman’s primary ob/gyn. The requirements
under Section 3(a)(i) shall not apply if, prior to the abortion, the physician
who will perform the abortion receives from the woman a written
certification that the woman (i) has no primary ob/gyn or (ii) having in
good faith exercised reasonable diligence to do so, has been unable to
schedule an appointment for urgent care with her primary ob/gyn for a
time within 72 hours of her first attempt to schedule such an appointment.
The requirements under Section 3(a)(ii) shall not apply if, prior to the
abortion, the physician who will perform the abortion receives from the
woman a written certification that the woman (i) has no primary internist
or (ii) having in good faith exercised reasonable diligence to do so, has
been unable to schedule an appointment for urgent care with her primary
internist for a time within 72 hours of her first attempt to schedule such
an appointment.
(c) A completed certification substantially in the form of EXHIBIT A, signed
by the individual whom the woman has certified in writing to be her
primary care physician, shall constitute evidence sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of Section 3(a).
(d) The evidence required under Section 3(a) and any certification obtained
under Sections 3(b) or 3(c) shall be maintained in the permanent files of
the facility in which the abortion was performed for a period of no less
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than seven years. 317 Such evidence and certifications shall be kept
confidential, but may be inspected by local, state, or national public health
officers.
(e) Neither the recommendation of a woman’s primary care physician nor
any referral by such person shall limit (i) the ability of the woman to
decide to have an abortion or to have an abortion performed by a
physician of her choosing and (ii) the ability of a physician to perform an
abortion for the woman.
Section 4. OBLIGATIONS OF OB/GYNS AND INTERNISTS. 318 An ob/gyn or
internist located in this State:
(a) shall consider a woman’s request for consultation as contemplated by
Section 3(a) of this Act [(or by a similar provision under the law of
another jurisdiction)]319 to be a request for urgent or similar care and in
good faith shall attempt to schedule an appointment with the woman as
soon as reasonably practicable in accordance with such physician’s
normal procedure for scheduling and prioritizing appointments for urgent
or similar care.
(b) with whom the woman consults as contemplated by Section 3(a) [(or by
a similar provision under the law of another jurisdiction)]320 shall inform
the woman of her right to withhold consent to disclosure to third parties
of the substance of any information discussed during the course of the
consultation and shall provide the woman with such forms as may be
necessary to revoke any consent previously given that otherwise would
authorize the physician to make such disclosure.
(c) shall, in the course of an appointment scheduled for consultation as
contemplated by Section 3(a) of this Act [(or by a similar provision under

317. Based on the recordkeeping provision that the U.S. Supreme Court determined
constitutional in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 81, 86 (1976).
318. States have substantial latitude in regulating physician conduct. See Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (concluding that compelling a physician to provide
information to a woman seeking an abortion is permissible because a state has the power to adopt
reasonable regulations with respect to the practice of medicine). See also Scott W. Gaylord, A
Matter of Context: Casey and the Constitutionality of Compelled Physician Speech, 43 J. L. MED.
& ETHICS 35, 45 (2012) (“The Court [has] recognized that the State has broad latitude to regulate
the practice of medicine.”).
319. Included to assist in cross-jurisdictional application.
320. Included to assist in cross-jurisdictional application.
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the law of another jurisdiction)], 321 provide such consultation as the
ob/gyn or internist, as applicable, considers appropriate based on his or
her own professional judgment; provided that no ob/gyn or internist shall
be required (i) to make a recommendation as to the advisability of a
woman’s having an abortion or (ii) to make a referral to a physician to
perform an abortion for any woman.
Section 5. UNLAWFUL REMUNERATION FOR REFERRALS. It shall be unlawful
for any physician to, knowingly and willfully, solicit or receive any
remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly,
overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind, in return for referring a woman to another
physician for the purposes of performing an abortion;322 provided that a personal
referral by a physician to another physician in the same group practice as the
referring physician shall not violate the prohibition in this Section (a). For
purposes of this Section, the term “group practice” has the meaning set forth in
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(4).
Section 7. PENALTIES.
(a) The following persons shall be guilty of a __________, and upon
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $__________________:
(i)
Any physician who (A) performs an abortion in violation of
Section 3(a) of this Act, (B) fails to comply with his or her
obligations under Section 4 of this Act, or (C) who violates the
prohibition in Section 5 of this Act;
(ii)
Any physician or other person who fails to comply with the
confidentiality requirements under Section 3(d) of this Act; and
(iii)
Any person who knowingly and willfully engages in a plan,
scheme, practice, or activity designed to evade the requirements
of this Act.
(b) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, a woman
upon whom an abortion is performed in violation of this Act may not be
prosecuted or held civilly liable for such violation of this Act or for a
conspiracy to violate this Act.323
Section 8. SEVERABILITY. If any one or more provisions, sections,
subsections, sentences, clauses, phrases, or words of this Act or the application
thereof to any person or circumstance is found to be unconstitutional, the same
321. Included to assist in cross-jurisdictional application.
322. Based on Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 1177, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7b(b) (2012).
323. See Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2015, S. 48, 114th Cong. § 3(a) for a
similar provision.
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is hereby declared to be severable, and the balance of this Act shall remain
effective, notwithstanding such unconstitutionality. The [General
Assembly/Legislature] hereby declares that it would have passed this Act, and
each provision, section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase, or word thereof,
irrespective of the fact that any one or more provisions, sections, subsections,
sentences, clauses, phrases, or words be declared unconstitutional.324
Exhibit A
CERTIFICATION BY PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIAN
PATIENT:

_____________________________________

1. I, the undersigned physician, hereby certify as follows:
I am a physician licensed under the laws of ______________ and engaged in
the practice of:
____
____
____
____
____

family medicine.
general pediatric medicine.
general internal medicine.
internal medicine/pediatrics.
obstetrics/gynecology.

2. I have a professional relationship with the above-named patient (the
“Patient”) for the purposes of providing:
____ non-emergency gynecological and/or obstetrical care.
____ first contact and continuing care with respect to undiagnosed signs,
symptoms, or health concerns not limited by problem, origin, organ
system, or diagnosis.
3. I have been informed by the Patient that she is considering having an
abortion with respect to a presently existing pregnancy (the “Abortion”),
and she has requested that I refer her to a physician to perform the
Abortion.
4. The Patient has been my patient for purposes of the care described in
paragraph 2 since _______________, which I reasonably believe is
before the date on which the Patient’s presently existing pregnancy began.
324. Based on N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.92.
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5. I have consulted with the Patient regarding her decision to have the
Abortion.
____ In my medical judgment based upon the information I have, the
Abortion is advisable in the Patient’s particular circumstances.
____ In my medical judgment based upon the information I have, the
Abortion is not advisable in the Patient’s particular circumstances.
____ I have declined to make any recommendation as to the advisability
of the Abortion.
My reason(s) for the determination indicated above or for declining to
make a recommendation are as follows (attach additional pages as
necessary):
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________

6. I have:
____ referred the patient to a physician for the purposes of performing
the Abortion.
____ declined to make a referral to a physician for the purposes of
performing the Abortion.
If I have declined to make a referral, my reason(s) for doing so are as
follows (attach additional pages as necessary):
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
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7. If I have made a referral to a physician for the purposes of performing the
Abortion, (i) I have not received, directly or indirectly, any remuneration
for making such referral, (ii) I do not expect to receive, directly or
indirectly, any remuneration for making such referral, and (iii) if offered
to me, I will not accept, directly or indirectly, any remuneration for
making such referral.

Date: ________

Signature:

____________________

Name:

____________________

Address:

____________________
____________________
____________________

Telephone:

____________________
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